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INTRODUCTION
Mr. President, Sir. We've received human intel confirmation.
That bastard bin Laden is producing chemical weapons at a fa-
cility in the Sudan. Now, the terrorist mastermind who declared
jihad on the United States and blew up our embassies in Tanza-
nia and Kenya has the poor man's version of the atom bomb!
* Professor of Law and Director of the Center for International Law and Policy, New
England School of Law; formerly Attorney-Adviser, Office of the Legal Adviser, U.S. De-
partment of State, 1989-1993; J.D. Duke University School of Law, 1988; A.B., Duke
University, 1985. The author expresses appreciation to Jon Lindeman, Jr. and Jeffrey DiA-
mico for their research assistance. This article is an expanded and updated version of the
lead paper presented on November 18, 1998, at the Hoover Institution Conference on Bio-
logical and Chemical Weapons at Stanford University.
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[Explicative]... General, what are our options?
A conversation like the fictional colloquy set forth above took place
between President Clinton and his military advisers on the eve of the
U.S. cruise missile attack on the Sudanese chemical weapons plant on
August 20, 1998.' The purpose of this article is to provide a comprehen-
sive answer to the President's inquiry. First, it analyzes the costs and
benefits of the various means of responding to violations of the interna-
tional ban on chemical and biological weapons, and then suggests
alternatives that have not yet been explored.
In spite of the dreadful effects of biological and chemical weapons,
nations regularly disregard treaties that forbid the use of such weapons
and continue to develop, produce, stockpile, and use threatening quanti-
ties of these deadly agents. Chemical and biological weapons have been
used in a wide range of conflicts, including Afghanistan, Chechnya,
Eritrea, Laos, Myanmar (Burma), Sri Lanka, Yemen, and the former
Yugoslavia.2 By far the best documented cases are Iraq's use in its
1980-88 war against Iran, and subsequently against Kurdish groups in
northern Iraq.3 In the aftermath of the 1990-91 Persian Gulf conflict,
inspections by U.N. teams revealed an enormous inventory of chemical
weapons. Documents seized from the Iraqi Defense Ministry indicated
that Iraq possessed a substantial biological warfare capability at the time
of the Gulf War.5 Some twenty other countries possess or are currently
6suspected of possessing these weapons.
For a variety of reasons, the proliferation of chemical and biological
weapons has recently begun to pose a much greater and more immediate
1. See infra notes 78-92 and accompanying text. While the President's advisors pro-
vided an analysis of the operational costs and benefits of the possible options, "reliable
sources" have acknowledged that the President did not seek an analysis of the international
law implications from the Department of State's Office of the Legal Advisor until after the
attack was launched. Bruce Zagaris, Owner of Bombed Sudanese Pharmaceutical Plant
Presses the U.S. for Compensation and Release of Frozen Funds, 15 INT'L LAW REPORTER
97, 98 (1999).
2. BURNS WESTON ET AL., INTERNATIONAL LAW AND WORLD ORDER 462 (3rd ed.
1997); Miriam E. Sapiro, Investigative Allegations of Chemical or Biological Warfare: The
Canadian Contribution, 80 AM. J. INT'L L. 678 n.3 (1986) (citing reports of U.N. investiga-
tors) [hereinafter Sapiro, Investigative Allegations].
3. See Sapiro, Investigative Allegations, supra note 2, at n.2.
4. Andrew D. McClintock, The Law of War: Coalition Attacks on Iraqi Chemical and
Biological Weapon Storage and Production Facilities, 7 EMORY INT'L L. REv. 633 (1993).
5. According to U.S. officials, documents seized from the Iraqi Defense Ministry indi-
cated the production of anthrax, botulinum toxin, and clostridium perfingens (the causative
agent of gangrene). Id. at 634 n. 2.
6. Jonathan B. Tucker, Director of the Center for Nonproliferation Studies, The Cur-
rent Status of the BCW Regimes, Paper Delivered at the Hoover Institution Conference on
Biological and Chemical Weapons at Stanford University, November 16-18, 1998, at 1 (on
file with the author).
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threat to international security than in prior years. The globalization of
industry has greatly increased access to the technology, expertise, and
raw materials required to produce chemical and biological weapons.
Unlike nuclear weapons programs, which require sensitive materials
that are difficult and expensive to produce and specialized facilities for
bomb fabrication, chemical and biological weapons can be developed
by most countries and determined terrorist organizations, because they
can be produced with readily available dual-use equipment and sub-
stances.7 Thus, chemical and biological weapons can be developed by
most countries and even terrorist organizations that are determined to do
so. Moreover, if a State can mate chemical and biological weapons to
missile delivery systems, it gives that State the ability to attack enemy
population centers. For this reason, leaders in the developing world
think of chemical and biological weaponry as "the poor man's atom
bomb."8 In addition, chemical and biological weapons have proliferated
to states, such as Iraq and North Korea, which have repeatedly flaunted
international standards and have been known to sponsor terrorism, in-
creasing the likelihood that these weapons will proliferate still further.
Finally, the prohibition on the production and use of these weapons has
been weakened by the failure of the international community to respond
to Iraq's use of them against Iran and against the Iraqi Kurds.
Currently there are two means of enforcing the international prohi-
bition of chemical and biological weapons. First, the international
community can induce compliance through imposition of sanctions,
such as trade embargoes, freezing of assets and diplomatic isolation.
Second, when sanctions fail, States can individually or collectively re-
spond to the threat of chemical or biological weapons by using military
force. After exploring the potential strengths and weaknesses of these
approaches, this article examines the desirability of supplementing them
with a third approach based on the criminal prosecution of persons re-
sponsible for the production, stockpiling, transfer, or use of chemical
and biological weapons.
I. THE LETTER OF THE LAW
Before scrutinizing the means of enforcing the ban on chemical and
biological weapons, it is necessary to understand the scope of the prohi-
bition. This section examines the coverage of the law, and demonstrates
7. Anne Q. Connaughton & Steven C. Goldman, The Chemical Weapons Convention
and Department of Commerce Responsibilities, 760 PLI/CoMM 533, 537-538 (1997).
8. Brad Roberts, Controlling Chemical Weapons, 2 TRANS. L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 435
(1992).
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that at least part of the problem is due to inadequacies in the existing
chemical and biological weapons treaty regimes: the 1907 Hague Con-
vention, the 1925 Geneva Protocol, the 1972 Biological Weapons
Convention, and the 1993 Chemical Weapons Convention.
A. The 1907 Hague Convention
The laws of war were first comprehensively codified in the 1907
Hague Convention, 9 which constitutes an authoritative source of cus-
tomary international law.' ° Article 23 of the 1907 Hague Convention
prohibits the use of poisonous weapons," as well as the deployment of
weapons "calculated to cause unnecessary suffering."'' 2 Unfortunately,
these prohibitions did not deter the use of chemical weapons by both
sides in World War 1.' 3 It is estimated that the use of chlorine and mus-
tard gas during that war caused over a million casualties, including
90,000 deaths."
9. Convention (IV) Respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land, 18 October
1907, reprinted in DOCUMENTS ON THE LAWS OF WAR 44 (Adam Roberts & Richard Guelff
eds., 2d ed. 1989) [The Hague Convention].
10. The Secretary-General of the United Nations stated in his report on the Statute of
the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, that "the part of conventional
international humanitarian law which has beyond doubt become part of international cus-
tomary law is the law applicable in armed conflict as embodied in: ... the Hague
Convention (IV) Respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land and the Regulations
annexed thereto of 18 October 1907;... See Report of the Secretary-General Pursuant to
Paragraph 2 of Security Council Resolution 808 (1993), para. 35, U.N. Doc. S/25704, 3 May
1993, reprinted in 2 VIRGINIA MORRIS AND MICHAEL P. SCHARF, AN INSIDER'S GUIDE TO
THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL TRIBUNAL FOR THE FORMER YUGOSLAVIA 3, 9 (1995). See
also paras. 609-617 of the judgment of the International Criminal Tribunal in the Tadic case
(IT-94-I-T), May 7, 1997, reprinted in relevant part in JOHN R.W.D. JONES, THE PRACTICE
OF THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL TRIBUNALS FOR THE FORMER YUGOSLAVIA AND RWANDA
40(1998).
11. See supra note 9, art. 23(a).
12. Id. art. 23(b). The 1977 Protocol I Additional to the 1949 Geneva Conventions
similarly provides:
I. In any armed conflict, the right of the Parties to the conflict to choose
methods or means of warfare is not unlimited.
2. It is prohibited to employ weapons, projectiles and material and methods
of warfare of a nature to cause superfluous injury or unnecessary suffer-
ing.
3. It is prohibited to employ methods or means of warfare which are in-
tended, or may be expected, to cause widespread, long-term and severe
damage to the natural environment.
Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and Relating to the
Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts, 8 June 1977, art. 35, 1125 U.N.T.S.
3,21.
13. HILARE MCCOUBREY & NIGEL D. WHITE, INTERNATIONAL LAW AND ARMED CON-
FLICT 245 (1992).
14. Weston et al., supra note 2, at 463.
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B. The 1925 Geneva Protocol
In 1925, the Geneva Protocol (the Protocol) was established to ban
the "use in war of asphyxiating, poisonous or other gasses, and of all
analogous liquids, materials or devices."'" The Geneva Protocol was a
direct response to the failure of the 1907 Hague Convention to prevent
the use of chemical weapons during World War I. Over 145 States have
ratified the 1925 Geneva Protocol. 6 The treaty was thought to have pre-
vented the use of chemical weapons by all of the European belligerents
in World War II.17
However, in subsequent years it became increasingly evident that,
because of the many gaping holes in coverage, the Protocol was just as
ineffective in preventing the production and use of biological and
chemical weapons as its predecessor. First, many States reserved the
right to use chemical and biological weapons against non-parties and to
retaliate in kind against parties who used chemical or biological weap-
ons first. In addition, the Protocol does not ban the design, testing,
production, or stockpiling of biological or chemical weapons or precur-
sors, thereby providing an incentive for countries to continue producing
and stockpiling these weapons, and ensuring the short order availability
of such weapons for retaliatory purposes. Moreover, the prohibition
does not apply to peacetime use of chemical or biological weapons. Nor
does it apply to internal use by a government against its own citizens
such as the Iraqi government's poison gas attacks on the Iraqi Kurds,
which resulted in the deaths of several hundred thousand people. Fur-
ther, the Protocol contains no verification regime to investigate
suspected violations and ensure compliance with the prohibition. Fi-
nally, the Protocol has not been enforced. The international community
has not imposed sanctions for documented violations of this Protocol,
such as the use by Iraq of chemical weapons against Iran.' 8 Nor has the
international community imposed sanctions on countries which export
15. Protocol for the Prohibition of the Use in War of Asphyxiating, Poisonous or Other
Gases, and of Bacteriological Methods of Warfare done June 17, 1925, 26 U.S.T. 571,
[hereinafter Geneva Protocol of 1925].
16. See Theodor Meron, The Continuing Role of Custom in the Formation of Interna-
tional Humanitarian Law, 90 AM. J. INT'L L. 238, 246 (1996).
17. See generally RICHARD M. PRICE, THE CHEMICAL WEAPONS TABOO (1997). Price
argues that the 1925 Geneva Protocol created a "chemical weapons taboo" which was a nec-
essary condition for the avoidance of chemical warfare in World War II. The author
acknowledges, however, that the non-use of chemical weapons during the war was largely
out of fear that the opposing side would respond by employing chemical weapons against
population centers.
18. See supra note 7, at 536-37.
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chemical weapons precursors. 9 In light of these weaknesses, it became
apparent that the Protocol was not an adequate solution to the problems
posed by the frequent use of chemical weapons and the growing prolif-
eration and stockpiling of biological weapons."
C. The Biological Weapons Convention
Some of the weaknesses of the 1925 Geneva Protocol were elimi-
nated by the 1972 Biological Weapons Convention, which entered into
force in 1975.2' The Biological Weapons Convention was the first treaty
to totally outlaw an entire category of weapons.
Under Article I of the 1972 Convention, each State party agrees
never to produce, stockpile, or otherwise acquire:
1. [M]icrobial or other biological agents or toxins whatever
their origin or method of production of types and in quanti-
ties that have no justification for prophylactic, protective or
other peaceful purposes; [and]
2. [W]eapons, equipment or means of delivery designed to use
such agents or toxins for hostile purposes or in armed con-
flict.22
Article II requires each State Party to destroy existing stockpiles of
biological weapons within nine months of the Convention's entry into
force.23
The 1972 Biological Weapons Convention, which has been widely
ratified, reflects a comprehensive repudiation of the development, pro-
duction, and stockpiling of biological weaponry. Despite its symbolic
importance as a norm creating treaty, the absence of verification and
enforcement provisions has rendered it "merely a paper agreement that
could easily be circumvented. ' 4 This became apparent when, in 1979,
19. See Paul Rubenstein, State Responsibility for Failure to Control the Export of
Weapons of Mass Destruction, 23 CAL. W. INT'L L.J. 319, 322-27 (1993). Rubenstein ar-
gues that countries like Germany which allowed the export of chemical precursors, chemical
process equipment, and technical expertise to Iraq during the 1980s could be held liable
under principles of state responsibility since it was reasonably foreseeable that Iraq would
use them to produce chemical weapons for aggressive use.
20. See Peter H. Oppenheimer, A Chemical Weapons Regime for the 1990s: Satisfying
Seven Critical Criteria, 11 WIs. INT'L L.J. 1 (1992).
21. Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of
Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on their Destruction, opened for sig-
nature April 10, 1972, 26 U.S.T. 583 [hereinafter Biological Weapons Convention].
22. Id. art. I.
23. Id. art. I.
24. See Susan Wright, Prospects for Biological Disarmament in the 1990s, 2 TRAN-
SNAT'L. L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 453, 454 (1992); see also NICHOLAS A. SIMs, THE
DIPLOMACY OF BIOLOGICAL DISARMAMENT: VICISSITUDES OF A TREATY IN FORCE, 1975-85
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an accident at a covert Soviet biological weapons plant was responsible
for the outbreak of an epidemic of anthrax in Sverdilovsk, USSR, which
may have killed up to a thousand persons."
Like the Protocol, the Biological Weapons Convention is riddled
with gaps and loopholes. First, biological weapons research is not pro-
hibited. Second, the Article I limitation to biological agents or toxins
"that have no justification for prophylactic, protective or other peaceful
purposes" constitutes an enormous loophole since "protective" and
"peaceful" applications cannot reliably be distinguished from hostile
military applications. Similarly, the obligation to destroy stockpiles for
any biological agent or toxins contained in Article II does not apply to
biological agents that are "divert[ed] to peaceful purposes," thereby
providing states an alarming degree of discretion.26
In 1994, the Parties to the Biological Weapons Convention estab-
lished an Ad Hoc Group of fifty interested member-States to draft a
Compliance Protocol to strengthen the Convention.27 "The fifth draft of
the Compliance Protocol, produced in July 1998, was 251 pages long
and consisted of 23 articles, seven annexes, and five appendices. This
draft of the treaty also contained more than 3,000 bracketed items indi-
cating points of disagreement."28 The Ad Hoc Group plans to meet again
in 1999 to complete the Protocol.
D. The Chemical Weapons Convention
"Given the inherent limitations of the Geneva Protocol, in 1968 the
international community began negotiating a comprehensive chemical
weapons convention that would ban not only the use, but also the pro-
duction and stockpiling of chemical weapons, and that would
additionally provide the means to verify compliance and to sanction
(1988. Sims concludes, "Those who took the British initiative of 1968 [which included
strong provisions for verification and complaint investigation] and watered it down into the
Convention of 1972 gave the world biological disarmament on the cheap: a disarmament
regime of minimal machinery which would cost next to nothing to sustain. It is now pain-
fully evident that these short-term savings have been outweighed by the long-term costs of a
regime lacking the means to sustain its credibility in the face of suspicious events which
cannot be resolved one way or the other." at 290.
25. Raymond A. Zilinskas, Book Review, 84 AM. J. INT'L L. 984, 984-85 (1990)
(reviewing NICHOLAS A. SIMS, THE DIPLOMACY OF BIOLOGICAL DISARMAMENT: VICISSI-
TUDES OF A TREATY IN FORCE, 1975-85 (1988)).
26. Richard A. Falk, Inhibiting Reliance on Biological Weaponry: The Role and Rele-
vance of International Law, 1 AM. U. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y 17 (1986).
27. See supra note 6, at 8.
28. Id. at 9.
29. See id. at I1-12.
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violations."3° The objective of the Chemical Weapons Convention (the
Convention) was to eliminate an entire class of weapons of mass de-
struction.
On April 29, 1997, the Convention entered into force.31 Over 100
states, including the United States, China, India, Iran and Russia, have
ratified or acceded to the Convention.3 ' The Convention prohibits the
development, production, or other acquisition, retention, stockpiling,
transfer, and use of chemical weapons and chemical weapons produc-
tion facilities.33 It also prohibits State Parties from engaging in any
military preparations to use chemical weapons and from assisting or
inducing anyone to engage in an activity that is prohibited by the Con-
vention. The Convention requires State Parties to eliminate all chemical
weapons and chemical weapons production facilities under their juris-
diction or control within ten years of accession.
Most importantly, the Chemical Weapons Convention establishes a
permanent Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (the
OPCW), whose role is to monitor implementation of the agreement
through on-site inspections, including inspections of private, non-
military chemical production facilities.34 In addition, the Convention
provides for challenge inspections of any facility or location, public or
private, when a State Party suspects that the facility is not in compliance
with the Convention. Because of its extensive verification procedures,
the Convention is estimated to cost between $33 million and $500 mil-
lion per year to operate."
While the verification provisions of the Chemical Weapons Con-
vention have been heralded as "among the most intricate and intrusive
30. Supra note 7, at 537.
31. See John J. Kim & Gregory Gerdes, International Institutions, 32 INT'L LAW. 575,
590 (1998).
32. See id. The United States Senate gave its advice and consent to the Chemical Weap-
ons Convention on April 24, 1997, subject to twenty-eight conditions. Notably among these
is Condition 28, which requires the President to certify that proper search warrants will be
obtained for any U.S. facility subject to inspection when consent of the owner was withheld.
This condition responded to concerns that U.S. businesses could be subject to unreasonable
searches and seizures by the Convention in contravention of their Fourth Amendment rights.
33. Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling and Use
of Chemical Weapons and on the Destruction, Jan. 13, 1993, S. TREATY Doc. No. 21, 103D
CONG., 1ST SESS. (1993), reprinted in 32 I.L.M. 800 [hereinafter Chemical Weapons Con-
vention]. For an analysis of the Convention's negotiating history, see WALTER KRUTZSCH &
RALF TRAPP, A COMMENTARY ON THE CHEMICAL WEAPONS CONVENTION (1994), and THO-
MAS BERNAUER, THE PROJECTED CHEMICAL WEAPONS CONVENTION: A GUIDE TO THE
NEGOTIATIONS IN THE CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT (1990).
34. Under Article III of the Chemical Weapons Convention, parties must disclose to the
OPCW the location of their production facilities and chemical weapons stockpiles. See supra
note 33.
35. See Zilinskas, supra note 25, at 986.
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ever designed for a disarmament regime, 36 the Convention is not with-
out its flaws. In particular, the Convention does not provide mandatory
sanctions against violators. Nor does it apply to numerous "hold-out"
states which continue to refuse to join37 or non-State actors, such as ter-
rorist or paramilitary groups. Moreover, it only "regulates chemical
weapons and their precursors in terms of tons," even though technologi-
cal developments have produced agents only a few grams of which are
lethal.38 And it permits any State Party to withdraw from the regime in
"the supreme interests of the country" on only ninety days notice.
The Convention's most significant weakness is the result of ill-
conceived action by the U.S. Congress. In enacting implementing leg-
islation, Congress included three "poison-pill" provisions introduced by
treaty opponents that could eviscerate the Chemical Weapons Conven-
tion's verification regime." One provision authorizes the president to
refuse a challenge inspection on "national security grounds," the second
prevents the removal of samples from U.S. territory for analysis, and the
third sharply limits the number of U.S. chemical plants subject to in-
spection. Other countries are likely to treat these as equivalent to
reservations and assert them to frustrate verification.4°
II. MEANS OF ENFORCEMENT
A. Security Council Enforcement
None of the treaties on chemical and biological weapons provide
for the imposition of mandatory sanctions against violators. The par-
ties to these treaties can individually or collectively impose sanctions,
36. Oppenheimer, supra note 20, at 44.
37. Most of the middle eastern countries did not sign and have not ratified or acceded to
the Chemical Weapons Convention, citing Israel's refusal to sign the Nuclear non-
Proliferation Treaty. See id. at 45.
38. Id.
39. See supra note 6, at 7.
40. The result would be similar to the effect of the U.S. "Connally Reservation" to the
compulsory jurisdiction of the International Court of Justice, which provided that the United
States acceptance of the World Court's jurisdiction would not apply to "disputes with regard
to matters which are essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of the United States of
America as determined by the United States of America." BARRY E. CARTER & PHILLIP R.
TRIMBLE, INTERNATIONAL LAW 305-06 (2d ed. 1995). One of the reasons given for the U.S.
withdrawal from the compulsory jurisdiction of the International Court of Justice in 1986
was that every time the United States attempted to bring a case against a country before the
International Court of Justice, the country used the reservation against the United States via
reciprocity to successfully defeat the International Court's jurisdiction. See Statement by the
Legal Adviser, Abraham D. Sofaer, to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee (Dec. 4,
1985), reprinted in id. at 324.
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but embargoes are ineffective unless they are universally enforced.
Thus, the U.N. Security Council may increasingly be called upon to re-
spond to violations of the chemical and biological weapons conventions.
The United Nations Charter charges the Security Council with the
responsibility for determining the existence of any threat to, or breach
of, the peace. Articles 41 and 42 of the Charter authorize the Security
Council to restore international peace and security, by force if neces-
sary. The Security Council may call upon U.N. members to impose
sanctions and to use force to ensure compliance, e.g., to interdict vessels
violating an embargo. The Security Council can also freeze the assets of
responsible leaders4 and ban their travel.42 Furthermore, the Security
Council can call upon or authorize states to use military force in re-
sponse to a violation of the international prohibition on biological and
chemical weapons. The Security Council can even authorize the capture
of persons responsible for serious violations of international law. 3
In the aftermath of Iraq's invasion of Kuwait, the Security Council
adopted a series of resolutions to compel Iraq to destroy its arsenal of
chemical and biological weapons. After Iraq invaded Kuwait, the Secu-
rity Council imposed sweeping sanctions and authorized the use of force
against Iraq.4 At the conclusion of the Persian Gulf conflict, the Secu-
rity Council adopted Resolution 687 (1991), which specified the
conditions which Iraq must satisfy before sanctions would be lifted.4 , To
avoid the possibility of a future Iraqi threat using biological or chemical
weapons, 6 Resolution 687 required Iraq to "unconditionally accept the
41. See S.C. Res. 841, U.N. SCOR, 48th Sess., 3238th mtg. at 3, U.N. Doc. SIRES/841
(1993) (freezing the assets of the de facto military regime in Haiti and their major civilian
supporters).
42. See S.C. Res. 1137, U.N. SCOR, 52nd Sess., 3831st mtg., U.N. Doc. S/RES/1137
(1997) (imposing travel restrictions on Iraqi leaders).
43. See S.C. Res. 837, U.N. SCOR, 48th Sess., 3229th mtg. at 83, U.N. Doc. S/RES/837
(1993) (authorizing the "arrest, and detention for prosecution, trial and punishment," of So-
mali warlord Mohamed Farrah Aidid, who was responsible for the murder of 24 U.N.
Peacekeeping troops in 1993).
44. See S.C. Res. 660, U.N. SCOR, 45th Sess., 2932nd mtg., U.N. Doc. S/RES/660
(1990) (demanding withdrawal of Iraqi troops from Kuwait); S.C. Res. 661, U.N. SCOR,
45th Sess., 2933rd mtg., U.N. Doc. S/RES/661 (1990) (imposing economic sanctions); S.C.
Res. 665, U.N. SCOR, 45th Sess., 2938th mtg., U.N. Doc. S/RES/665 (1990) (authorizing
use of force to enforce the embargo); S.C. Res. 678, U.N. SCOR, 45th Sess., 2963rd mtg.,
U.N. Doc. S/RES/678 (1990) (authorizing invasion of Iraq by coalition forces).
45. S.C. Res. 687, U.N. SCOR, 46th Sess., 2981st mtg., U.N. Doc. S/RES/687 (1991).
46. In a letter to the leaders of the House and Senate regarding Iraq, President Clinton
stated in relevant part:
Sanctions against Iraq were imposed as a result of Iraq's invasion of Kuwait. It has been
necessary to sustain them because of Iraq's failure to comply with relevant UNSC resolu-
tions, including those to ensure Saddam Hussein is not allowed to resume the unrestricted
development and production of weapons of mass destruction.
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destruction, removal, or rendering harmless, under international super-
vision, of... [a]ll chemical and biological weapons and all stocks of
agents and all related subsystems and components and all research, de-
velopment, support, and manufacturing facilities."47 The preamble of
Resolution 687 invokes inter alia the 1925 Geneva Protocol and the
1972 Biological Weapons Convention as the justification for imposing
this requirement.
Resolution 687 required Iraq to divulge the locations, amounts, and
types of its chemical and biological weapons to the Secretary-General of
the United Nations. The destruction of these materials was to be per-
formed under the supervision of the United Nations Special
Commission (UNSCOM), which was charged with the responsibility for
inspection and investigation of all known or suspected weapon sites.
After a series of violations of Resolution 687, culminating in Iraq's re-
fusal to allow the inspection teams access to sites designated by
UNSCOM, 8 the United States and Great Britain threatened to use mili-
tary force to compel Iraqi compliance.4 9 The United States and Great
Britain asserted that such force was permitted by Resolution 678, which
authorized member states to use all necessary means to uphold and im-
plement "all relevant resolutions" subsequent to Resolution 660.50 Air
strikes were temporarily averted when, on February 23, 1998, Iraq's
Deputy Prime Minister Tariq Aziz and United Nations Secretary-
General Kofi Annon signed a Memorandum of Understanding in which
Iraq agreed to accord "immediate, unconditional and unrestricted ac-
cess" to UNSCOM.5'
Clinton Letter to the Leaders of House and Senate, Iraq (Dec. 1, 1997) (visited October
1, 1998) <http://www.usis.usemb.se/regional/nea/gulfsec/clnt1201.htm>.
47. Supra note 45, at 8.
48. See Standoff in Iraq: Chronology of Iraqi Violations (visited Oct. 1, 1998)
<http://www.foxnews.com/news/packages/iraq/violations.sml/>.
49. See Text of Clinton Statement on Iraq; Text of President Clinton's Address to Joint
Chiefs of Staff and Pentagon Staff (Feb. 17, 1998) (visited Oct. 1, 1998)
<http://europe.cnn.com/ALLPOLITICS/1998/02/17/transcripts/clinton.iraq/>.
50. See Frederic L. Kirgis, The Legal Background on the Use of Force to Induce Iraq to
Comply with Security Council Resolutions, ASIL FLASH INSIGHT, November 1997. The gov-
ernments of several other members of the Security Council, including China, France, and
Russia, have disputed that Resolution 678 can be used as an ongoing authority to use force.
See id.
51. Memorandum of Understanding between the United Nations and the Republic of
Iraq (Feb. 23, 1998) (visited Oct. 1, 1998) <http://www.cnn.com/WORLD/9802/23/
un.iraq.agreement/index.html>. The Memorandum of Understanding provides in relevant
part:
The United Nations and the government of Iraq agree that the following special proce-
dures shall apply to the initial and subsequent entries for the performance of the tasks
mandated at the eight Presidential Sites in Iraq as defined in the annex to the present Memo-
randum:
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Unfortunately, the February 23 Memorandum of Understanding
turned out to be a short-lived solution. Notwithstanding President Clin-
ton's warning "that if Saddam failed to cooperate fully [with UNSCOM],
we would be prepared to act without delay, diplomacy or warning," on
December 16, 1998, UNSCOM head Richard Butler reported to the Secu-
rity Council that Iraq was once again refusing to turn over key documents
and blocking inspections at suspected chemical and biological weapons
sites." Within hours of receiving Butler's report, the United States and the
United Kingdom launched a massive four-day air campaign against "a
wide range of Iraqi weapons facilities and intelligence installations." 3
From 1991-1998, the UNSCOM inspection regime was the most
intrusive and comprehensive ever imposed upon a nation. Notwith-
standing Saddam Hussein's intermittent intransigence to permit U.N.
inspections," the Security Council's approach to Iraqi chemical and
biological weapons convention violations provides a blue print for the
future.
B. Unilateral Military Action
1. Anticipatory Self-Defense
Prior to the advent of the United Nations Charter, there was a cus-
tomary right of reprisal, permitting nations to use military force to
(a) A Special Group shall be established for this purpose by the Secretary-
General in consultation with the Executive Chairman of UNSCOM and
the Director General of IAEA. This Group shall comprise senior diplo-
mats appointed by the Secretary-General and experts drawn from
UNSCOM and IAEA. The Group shall be headed by a Commissioner ap-
pointed by the Secretary-General.
(b) In carrying out its work, the Special Group shall operate under the estab-
lished procedures of UNSCOM and IAEA, and specific detailed
procedures which will be developed given the special nature of the Presi-
dential Sites, in accordance with the relevant resolutions of the Security
Council.
(c) The report of the Special Group on its activities and findings shall be
submitted by the Executive Chairman of UNSCOM to the Security Coun-
cil through the Secretary-General.
52. Gerald Seib and Thomas Ricks, Attack on Iraq: U.S. Launches Strike as Baghdad
Refuses to Comply with U.N., WALL ST. J., December 17, 1998, at Al.
53. Id.
54. See Paul Taylor, West Found Weakened in Annual Arms Survey, THE BOSTON
GLOBE, Oct. 23, 1998, at A2 ("The study [published by the International Institute for Strate-
gic Studies] noted that although the United States and Britain made a credible threat of force
in February to compel Iraq to resume cooperation with U.N. arms inspectors, they had not
acted after Baghdad in August effectively ended the searches for weapons of mass destruc-
tion.").
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enforce international obligations in certain limited circumstances. The
specific parameters governing lawful reprisals were set forth in the
Naulilaa Incident Arbitration decision: (1) the offending state must
have committed an act contrary to international law; (2) the injured state
must have made a demand on the offending state and that demand have
gone unsatisfied; and (3) the force used in the reprisal must be propor-
tionate to the offending act.55
If it were still good law, the doctrine of armed reprisal could be
used to justify an attack on a chemical or biological weapons facility
operating in violation of the chemical and biological weapons conven-
tions. The practice of the United Nations and the opinions of the World
Court, however, indicate that the right of armed reprisal is generally
contrary to the U.N. Charter. Numerous resolutions condemning armed
reprisals as inconsistent with the Charter have been adopted over the
56years. Most notably, the 1970 Declaration on Principles of Interna-
tional Law Concerning Friendly Relations and Co-operation Among
States in Accordance with the Charter of the United Nations, provides
that "states have a duty to refrain from acts of reprisal involving the use
of force. 57 The International Court of Justice implicitly rejected the
right of reprisal in the Corfu Channel Case8 and in the Case Concern-
ing United States Diplomatic and Consular Staff in Tehran.59 While the
U.N. Charter generally prohibits armed reprisals, such measures are
permissible if they qualify as an exercise of self-defense under Article
51 of the Charter.
Self-defense differs from reprisal, which is punitive in character, in
that the purpose of self-defense is to mitigate or prevent harm. But the
two concepts overlap in the case of anticipatory self-defense. Hugo
55. NAULILAA INCIDENT ARBITRATION, Portuguese-German Arbitral Tribunal, 8 Rec.
des dicis. Des trib. Arb. mixtes 409 (1928), translated and discussed in W. BISHOP, INTER-
NATIONAL LAW: CASES AND MATERIALS 903-04 (3d ed. 1971).
56. See Rex J. Zedalis, On the Lawfulness of Forceful Remedies for Violations of Arms
Control Agreements: "Star Wars" and other Glimpses at the Future, 18 N.Y.U. J. INT'L L.
& POL. 73, 123 (1985).
57. Declaration on Principles of International Law Concerning Friendly Relations and
Co-operation Among States in Accordance with the Charter of the United Nations, G.A. Res.
2625, U.N. GAOR, 25th Sess., Supp. No. 28, at 121, U.N. Doc. A/8028 (1970).
58. Corfu Channel Case, UK. v. Alb., 1949 I.C.J. 4 (rejecting British contention that a
mine sweeping operation to clear the waters of mines laid by Albania in contravention of
international law constituted a justifiable intervention in self-help to remedy the breach of a
general international obligation).
59. Case Concerning United States Diplomatic and Consular Staff in Tehran (U.S. v.
Iran), 1980 I.C.J. 3 (expressing concern in regard to the legality of the United States incur-
sion into Iran). Judge Morozov's dissenting opinion expressly characterized the incursion as
violative of the Charter because it did not meet the requirements of Article 5 I. Id. at 5 1, 56-
57 (Morozov, J., dissenting).
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Grotius, often regarded as the father of international law, first recog-
nized a State's right to use force to forestall an anticipated attack in
1625. 6 The contours of the right of anticipatory self-defense were
fleshed out in an exchange of diplomatic notes between the govern-
ments of the United States and Great Britain during the Caroline
incident of 1837.6' The two countries agreed that international law per-
mitted a military response to a threat, provided that the danger posed
was, in the words of U.S. Secretary of State Daniel Webster, "instant,
overwhelming, leaving no choice of means and no moment for delib-
eration."62 The Webster formulation of self-defense is often cited as
authoritative customary law. Following the Caroline incident, the im-
minent threat of armed attack has generally been found to justify
defensive military action, provided that the threatened nation has first
exhausted all peaceful means of resolution and that the action ultimately
taken was proportionate to the threat.
Scholars are divided over whether the specific language contained
in Articles 2(4) and 51 of the U.N. Charter has overridden the custom-
ary right of anticipatory self-defense as articulated during the Caroline
incident.63 Article 2(4) prohibits the use of military force in the territory
of another state without its consent.6 Article 51 provides an exception to
that prohibition for the case of self-defense in response to "an armed
60. HUGO GROTIus, THE LAW OF WAR AND PEACE 169-185 (1646) (Francis W. Kelsey,
trans., Clarendon Press, 1925).
61. In 1837, rebels in Upper Canada with American logistical support, unsuccessfully
revolted against British rule. The Canadian military identified the American steamboat,
Caroline, as a vessel running arms to the rebels and sent a military force into the United
States to set the ship ablaze, killing an American citizen in the process. Subsequently,
American officials arrested a Canadian citizen in New York for the murder which prompted
a protest by the British government. See Destruction of the "Caroline", 2 John B. Moore.
Dig. International Law Digest § 217, at 409-14.
62. Id. at 412.
63. Those taking the position that Article 51 prohibits anticipatory self-defense include:
Louis HENKIN, How Nations Behave, LAW AND FOREIGN POLICY (2d ed. 1979)at 141; PHILIP
C. JESSup, A MODERN LAW OF NATIONS 166-67 (3d ed. 1968); IAN BROWNLIE, INTERNA-
TIONAL LAW AND THE USE OF FORCE BY STATES, 275-76 (1963); HANS KELSEN, THE LAW
OF THE UNITED NATIONS 797-98 (1950); L OPPENHEIM, INTERNATIONAL LAW 156 (H. Lau-
terpacht ed. 7th ed. 1948). Those taking the position that Article 51 allows anticipatory self-
defense include: Abraham Sofaer, Terrorism, the Law, and National Defense, 126 MIL. L.
REV. 89 (1989); OSCAR SCHACHTER, INTERNATIONAL LAW IN THEORY AND PRACTICE 150-
52 (1991); YORAM DINSTEIN, WAR, AGGRESSION AND SELF DEFENSE, 172-76 (1988); D.W.
BOWETT, SELF-DEFENSE IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 188-89 (1958); M. McDougal, The So-
viet-Cuban Quarantine and Self-Defense, 57 AM. J. INT'L L. 597, 599-600 (1963).
64. Article 2(4) of the U.N. Charter provides: "All Members shall refrain in their inter-
national relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political
independence of any state, or in any other manner inconsistent with the Purposes of the
United Nations." U.N. CHARTER, art. 2(4).
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attack., 65 Those who favor a restrictive interpretation of self-defense,
argue that the original Charter signatories intended to supplant custom-
ary self-defense norms and rely on new U.N. enforcement mechanisms
for maintaining peace in an effort to minimize the overall use of force.
The modem, though by no means universal, trend is to interpret the
U.N. Charter as not requiring a state to absorb a devastating or even le-
thal first strike before acting to protect itself. International law "is not a
suicide pact, especially in an age of uniquely destructive weaponry., 66 It
is noteworthy that the equally authentic French version of Article 51
uses the phrase aggression armee, meaning "armed aggression," instead
of the more restrictive term "armed attack" contained in the English
version.67 The right to respond to armed aggression would include the
right to respond to threats, since aggression can exist separate from and
prior to an actual attack.6' Even if that was not the uniform interpretation
of the drafters of the U.N. Charter in 1948,69 interpretation of the Char-
ter must keep pace with technological developments in weaponry that
render restrictive interpretations obsolete.
This division among scholars reflects the discordant practice of the
United Nations as evidenced in particular by its contrary responses to
the Israeli preemptory air strike against Egypt in 1967 and the Israeli
bombardment of the Iraqi Osirak nuclear reactor in 1981.0 The United
Nations appeared to recognize the right of anticipatory self-defense
when Israel launched a preemptory airstrike against Egypt, precipitating
65. Article 51 of the U.N. Charter provides: "Nothing in the present Charter shall impair
the inherent right of individual or collective self-defense if an armed attack occurs against a
Member of the United Nations, until the Security Council has taken measures necessary to
maintain international peace and security." Id., art. 51.
66. Louis R. Beres, The Permissibility of State-Sponsored Assassination During Peace
and War, 5 TEMPLE INT'L & COMP. L. J. 231, 239 (1992).
67. Beth M. Polebaum, National Self-Defense in International Law: An Emerging Stan-
dard for a Nuclear Age, 59 N.Y.U.L. REV. 187, 202 (1984).
68. Id. at 202.
69. The meaning of "armed attack" may have appeared self-evident to the drafters of
the U.N. Charter who had just experienced a war which began with Hitler's massive blitz-
krieg assaults (accompanied by scores of tanks, planes, and soldiers) into Germany's
neighboring states.
70. The United Nations has also taken seemingly inconsistent stands on the issue in the
context of the 1986 U.S. air raid on Libya and the 1993 cruise missile attack on Iraq. The
overwhelming majority of the members of the United Nations rejected the United States'
claim that the Libyan raid was justified as anticipatory self-defense as discussed below. In
contrast, most members of the United Nations supported the claim by the United States that
the 1993 cruise missile attack on Iraq was justified as anticipatory self-defense in light of
Iraq's attempts to assassinate former President Bush. See generally Stuart G. Baker, Note,
Comparing the 1993 U.S. Airstrike on Iraq to the 1986 Bombing of Libya: The New Inter-
pretation of Article 51, 24 GA. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 99 (1994).
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the 1967 "Six Day War."7' Many countries supported Israel's right to
conduct defensive strikes prior to armed attack and draft resolutions
condemning the Israeli action were soundly defeated in the Security
Council and the General Assembly.
Fourteen years later, on June 7, 1981, Israeli pilots bombed the Iraqi
Osirik nuclear reactor. In a statement released after the air strike, the
Israeli government justified its action as an act of self-defense, claiming
that "sources of unquestioned reliability told us that [the reactor] was
intended ... for the production of atomic bombs. The goal for these
bombs was Israel."' 3 This time, the United Nations Security Council and
General Assembly responded by condemning Israel for the strike. 4
However, the resolution condemning Israel did not declare that the
threat to Israel was not credible, that the Israeli strike was dispropor-
tionate to the threat, or that Israel had failed to seek alternative peaceful
means to resolve the crisis. 75 Those commentators who agree with the
United Nations condemnation generally take the position that the Iraqi
threat to Israel was not sufficiently "immediate" within the formula or
71. The Israeli air strike was in response to Egyptian President Nasser having ordered
Egypt's armed forces into a state of maximum alert, terminating the presence of the United
Nations peacekeeping force in his country, and closing the Gulf of Aqaba and the Strait of
Tiran to Israeli shipping. A few days later, the armed forces of Syria, Jordan, and Iraq were
placed under unified Egyptian command. Israel pursued alternative means to resolve the
conflict by prevailing upon other nations to intercede. But with the Arab leaders issuing
increasingly bellicose threats, Israel initiated a preemptory air strike against the Egyptian
airfields. See Polebaum, supra note 67, at 193.
72. A draft resolution submitted by the Soviet Union calling for a condemnation of Is-
rael was not accepted by the Security Council. 22 U.N. SCOR (135th mtg.) at 5, U.N. Doc.
S/7951 Rev. 1 (1967). The same resolution was brought to the floor of the General Assembly
for a vote and was defeated. U.N. GAOR (5th Emergency Special Session, June 17, 1967-
Sept. 18, 1967) (154th mtg.) at 15-17, U.N. Doc. A/L.519 (4 July 1967).
73. Polebaum, supra note 67, at 205. Israel's attack on the Iraqi reactor should be
viewed within the context of the following factors: (1) Since Israel was created by the United
Nations in 1948, Iraq has sought Israel's destruction by participating in all wars against Is-
rael and by rejecting all possibilities for peace. Iraq has remained in an official state of war
with Israel throughout its existence. Id. at 218. (2) A few months prior to the bombing, the
Iraqi government issued public statements suggesting that its nuclear reactor was intended to
be used "against the Zionist enemy." Id. at 219. (3) Iraq had little need for peaceful nuclear
energy in light of its vast oil reserves. Id. at 221. (4) Intelligence indicated that the Iraqi
reactor would become operational in one to three months, after which time bombardment
would endanger civilians by releasing radioactive materials. Id. at 222. (5) While an attempt
at negotiations with Iraq would have been futile, Israel made repeated unsuccessfully diplo-
matic efforts to persuade the French and Italian governments to cease shipments of sensitive
nuclear material to Iraq. Id. at 223.
74. U.N. Doc. S/RES/487 (1981); G.A. Res. A/RES/36/27 (1981).
75. U.N. Res. 487, supra note 74; G.A. Res. 27, supra note 74; See also U.N. Doc. S/PV
2285 (1981).
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the spirit of the Caroline.76 Yet, the action of the United Nations,
"unaccompanied by clear explanations or analysis, seem[s] to represent
a mere political consensus and not a legal one."77
Notwithstanding the international community's condemnation of
the Israeli attack on the Iraqi nuclear plant, the United States took simi-
lar action on August 20, 1998,78 against a plant in Khartoum, Sudan
thought to be producing the lethal nerve agent VX and other chemical
weapons components. 9 The U.S. Government justified its cruise missile
attack on the Al-Shifa plant by stating that the plant had no commercial
uses, was closely guarded, and that its owner had close financial links to
Osama bin Laden, a Saudi exile suspected of masterminding the August
1998 bombings of two U.S. embassies in Kenya and Tanzania. 80 In ar-
guing that the attack on the Al Shifa plant was consistent with the right of
self defense under Article 51 of the U.N. Charter, Ambassador Bill Rich-
ardson informed the Security Council that the attack was necessary to
"deter and prevent the repetition of unlawful terrorist attacks on the
United States and other countries."8' But unlike past U.S. assertions of the
right of self-defense, Richardson's communication contained no eviden-
tiary support for the U.S. assertion.1
2
76. See Anthony D'Amato, Israel's Air Strike Upon the Iraqi Nuclear Reactor, 77 AM.
J. INT'L LAW 584 (1983).
77. Polebaum, supra note 67, at 217.
78. This was the second time that the Clinton Administration asserted the doctrine of
anticipatory-self defense to justify an attack. Five years earlier, it had relied on the doctrine
to justify its June 26, 1993 cruise missile attack on the Iraqi Intelligence Service Headquar-
ters in Baghdad in the aftermath of the failed attempt to assassinate former President Bush
during his visit to Kuwait. See Statement by Ambassador Madeleine K. Albright, United
States Permanent Representative to the United Nations, in the Security Council, on the Iraqi
Attempt to Assassinate President Bush (June 27, 1993), USUN PRESS RELEASE 110-(93),
June 27, 1993. The majority of States expressed no objections to the 1993 airstrike and seem
to have largely accepted the legal justification provided by the United States; the only States
that publicly condemned the U.S. action were China, Bangladesh, Yemen, Iran and Sudan.
Baker, supra note 70, at 99-104.
79. See generally Michael Barletta, Report: Chemical Weapons in the Sudan, 6 THE
NONPROLIFERATION REVIEW (1998).
80. CNN Interactive, U.S. Missiles Pound Targets in Afghanistan, Sudan (visited Sept.
16, 1998).
See also, Coordinator for Counterterrorism, U.S. Department of State, Fact Sheet: U.S.
Strike on Facilities in Afghanistan and Sudan, United States Information Agency, August 21,
1998 (visited April 20, 1999) <http://www.usia.gov/topical/pol/terror/98082112.htm>
81. Letter Dated 20 August 1998 From the Permanent Representative of the United
States of America to the United Nations Addressed to the President of the Security Council,
U.N. Doc. S/1998/760, 20 August 1998.
82. See Statement by Ambassador Madeleine K. Albright, United States Permanent
Representative to the United Nations, in the Security Council, on the Iraqi Attempt to Assas-
sinate President Bush, June 27, 1993, USUN Press Release 110-(93), June 27, 1993
(containing photographs and detailed intelligence proving Iraqi involvement in the attempted
assassination of former President Bush in Kuwait). See also, Milt Bearden, Explaining Our
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At first, international criticism of the attack on the Sudanese plant
was muted, which signaled acceptance of the principle of anticipatory
self-defense in the context of the destruction of a chemical weapons fa-
cilities in the hands of a known terrorist.83 However, world opinion,
even among America's closest allies, began to coalesce against the
United States when it turned out that Osama bin Laden had no financial
connection to the Sudanese plant and that the plant actually produced
drugs for treating malaria, diabetes, hypertension, ulcers, rheumatism,
gonorrhea, and tuberculosis.M The American case was further eroded
when it was discovered that the Sudanese plant had a contract with the
United Nations to provide these medicines-a contract which had been
approved by the United State Representative to the United Nations.85
While the U.S. Government steadfastly refused to provide its intelli-
gence data to dispel doubt, former U.S. President Jimmy Carter, as well
as several Arab countries, demanded an independent U.N. investigation
to determine whether chemical warfare agents could be detected in the
remains of the factory.86 In contrast with its support for the efforts of
UNSCOM to investigate potential chemical weapons sites in Iraq, the
United States blocked the Carter initiative, stating: "we don't think an in-
vestigation is needed. We don't think anything needs to be put to rest."87
It is noteworthy that the international response to the U.S. cruise
missile attack on the Sudanese plant focused on the degree of proof re-
quired, rather than the underlying legal right to launch anticipatory
attacks against chemical weapons facilities. Yet, having failed to suffi-
Actions in Sudan, N.Y. TIMES, August 26, 1998, (in justifying the 1986 bombing of Tripoli,
the Reagan administration released a decoded message intercepted from the Libyan mission
in East Germany, which proved Libyan involvement in the Labelle Disco bombing).
83. This is to be distinguished from the international community's vocal condemnation
of the United States' April 1986 air raid against targets in Libya, which were conducted in
response to the Libyan bombing of a German discotheque frequented by U.S. serviceman,
which is discussed below.
84. Colum Lynch, Allied Doubts Grow About US Strike on Sudanese Plant, THE Bos-
TON GLOBE, September 24, at A2; David L. Marcus, Frank Criticizes Bombing of Plant in
Sudan, THE BOSTON GLOBE, Sept. 24, 1998, at A9. The Al Shifa plant supplied sixty percent
of Sudan's pharmaceutical needs. See Barletta, supra note 79, at note 34. According to Suda-
nese doctors and health officials, the Al Shifa plant's destruction could lead to severe drug
shortages endangering the lives of thousands of Sudanese. Id.
85. In January 1998, the Al Shifa plant had been awarded a $199,000 contract to ship
100,000 cartons of Shifazole veterinary medicine to Iraq, as part of the U.N. oil-for-food pro-
gram. See Barletta, supra note 79, at note 37. See also Lynch, supra note 84, at A2; Marcus,
supra note 84, at A9.
86. Sudan's head of state, Omar al-Bashir, pledged that the Sudan would cooperate with a
United Nations on-site investigation of the remains of the Al Shifa plant to determine whether it
had been used to produce chemical weapons or precursor chemicals. See Barletta, supra note
79, at note 41. See also Lynch, supra note 84, at A2; Marcus, supra note 84, at A9.
87 Barletta, supra note 79, at notes 173-178.
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ciently prove its case, the action seriously undermined U.S. credibility,
making it more difficult to garner international support for such action
against biological or chemical weapons facilities in the future. As a
congressional critic of the attack against the Sudanese plant pointed out,
"Attacking an installation in another country may be justified, but
you've got to be very, very sure about the threats before launching the
attack. It is important to have self-defense capability, but if you overuse
it, you lose it.""8
The Sudanese bombing incident focused attention on the necessity
requirement of the doctrine of self-defense. Because a preemptory at-
tack on a chemical or biological weapons production or storage facility
can pose a serious threat to the surrounding civilian population, the is-
sue of proportionality may also become a source of controversy. A
direct hit on a conventional ammunition depot will create a massive ex-
plosion; any resulting collateral damage will be limited to the
immediate vicinity. In contrast, an attack on a chemical or biological
weapons facility could result in the release of a deadly cloud of gas.89
The extent of the contamination of the surrounding area would depend
on prevailing environmental conditions and the physical characteristics
of the chemical or biological agent.90 A World War II allied attack on an
Italian ship laden with 100 tons of mustard gas, which resulted in the
release of a poisonous cloud which drifted over the port town of Bari,
killing more than 1,000 civilians, demonstrated the potential for collat-
eral damage.9' During the Persian Gulf conflict, the U.S. Department of
Defense estimated that up to six million Iraqis could have been killed
from the dispersion of anthrax and botulism viruses caused by a single
attack on a biological weapons facility. 92 Thus, all but the most carefully
executed attacks on chemical or biological facilities will likely fail the
proportionality requirement of self-defense.
2. Assassination
Consider a situation in which a particular state determines that an-
other state plans to launch a chemical or biological surprise attack upon
its population centers. Intelligence assessments reveal that the assassi-
nation of selected key figures would prevent this attack altogether.
Intelligence further reveals that conventional forms of preemption
would generate far greater harm, especially if the attack resulted in
88. Marcus, supra note 84, at A9.
89. See McClintock, supra note 4, at 637-38.
90. Id. at 637-38.
91. Id. at 637 n.10.
92. Id.
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releasing the targeted chemical or biological agents. Under this sce-
nario, would a preemptive assassination violate international law?
Just as international law is not a suicide pact, neither is it a license
to kill. Assassination has traditionally been viewed as unlawful in both
war and peace. Where a condition of war exists between states, interna-
tional assassination constitutes a war crime. Article 23(B) of the Hague
Convention IV of 1907, provides that "it is especially forbidden ... to
kill or wound treacherously, individuals belonging to the hostile nation
or army. 93 The United States Army's field manual on the law of land
warfare has incorporated this prohibition in the following terms: "This
article ... prohibits assassination, proscription or outlawry of an en-
emy, or putting a price upon an enemy's head, as well as offering a
reward for an enemy 'dead or alive.' ,14
Yet the 1907 Hague Convention's prohibition on assassination is
not as broad as it might appear at first blush. Focusing on the
"treacherous" requirement of the Hague Convention, a recent military
legal analysis of war time assassination concluded that none of the fol-
lowing acts contravened the prohibition: (1) the November 18, 1941 raid
by Scottish commandos at Bedda Littoria, Libya whose goal was to kill
German Field Marshal Erwin Rommel; (2) the April 18, 1943 downing
of a Japanese aircraft known to be carrying Admiral Osoruku Ya-
mamoto by a U.S. Air Force jet fighter; and (3) the October 30, 1951 air
strike by the U.S. Navy that killed 500 senior Chinese and North Korean
military officers and security forces at a military planning conference at
Kapsan, North Korea.9
Where agents of one State assassinate the official of another state
during peacetime, the action may constitute an internationally prohib-
ited act of terrorism. Article 2(a) of the Convention on Internationally
Protected Persons, to which the United States and most other countries
are parties, criminalizes "the intentional commission of ... murder,
kidnapping or other attack upon the person or liberty of an internation-
ally protected person," which are defined to include heads of state and
other high level officials. 96 It is important to note, however, that the In-
ternationally Protected Persons Convention accords a head of state or
93. The Hague Convention, supra note 9, art. 23(b) (emphasis added).
94. Dep't of the Army, The Law of Land Warfare art. 31 (1956) (Army Field Manual
No. 27-10, Washington, D.C.) (emphasis added).
95. W. Hays Parks, Memorandum of Law: Executive Order 12333 and Assassination,
ARMY LAWYER, Dec. 1989 (Dept. of the Army Pamphlet 27-50-204), at 5.
96. Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of Crimes Against Internationally
Protected Persons, Including Diplomatic Agents, adopted Dec. 14, 1973, 28 U.S.T. 1975,
1037 U.N.T.S. 167.
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state official protected status only when the official is outside his/her
97own country.
Notwithstanding these international law prohibitions, according to
the results of a 1975 Senate investigation, United States presidents have
instigated plots to assassinate foreign leaders in Cuba, the Congo, the
Dominican Republic, Chile and South Vietnam.98 In response to these
revelations, President Gerald R. Ford promulgated Executive Order
12,333, which provides, "No person employed by or acting on behalf of
the United States Government shall engage in, or conspire to engage in,
assassination." 99
Although Executive Order 12,333 has been reissued by Presidents
Carter, Reagan, Bush and Clinton, ° its value is more symbolic than
real. A president can circumvent the ban posed by the Executive Order
and legally carry out an assassination in four ways: (1) he can declare
the existence of hostilities and target persons in command positions as
combatants; (2) he can broadly construe Article 51 to mean that certain
criminal acts justify the use of assassination as a legitimate means of
self-defense; (3) he can narrowly construe Executive Order 12,333, for
instance, to prohibit only "treacherous" attacks on foreign leaders; and
(4) he can simply repeal or amend the order, or even approve a one time
exception to it.'0
The contours of the Executive Order were tested by the 1986
bombing of Libyan leader Colonel Muammar Qaddafi's personal quar-
ters in Tripoli in response to Libyan involvement in the bombing of the
La Belle Disco in West Berlin. According to investigative reporter
Seymour M. Hersh, who spent three months interviewing more than
seventy current and former officials in the White House, the State De-
partment, the C.I.A., the National Security Agency, and the Pentagon,
Qaddafi's assassination was the primary goal of the Libyan bombing.
' 2
Hersh reported that nine of the eighteen American fighter jets that flew
97. The Convention defines "Internationally protected person" as: "Head of State, in-
cluding any member of a collegial body performing the functions of a Head of State under
the constitution of the State concerned, a Head of Government or a Minister for Foreign
Affairs, whenever any such person is in a foreign State, as well as members of his family
who accompany him." Id., art. l(l)(a).
98. Select Comm. to Study Governmental Operations, With Respect to Intelligence Ac-
tivities, Alleged Assassination Plots Involving Foreign Leaders, S. REP. No. 465, 94TH
CONG., 1ST SESS. (1975).
99. EXEC. ORDER No. 12,333, 3 C.F.R. 90 (1976).
100. Boyd M. Johnson, Ill, Executive Order 12,333: The Permissibility of an American
Assassination of a Foreign Leader, 25 CORNELL INT'L L. J. 401, 403 (1992).
101. Id.
102. Seymour M. Hersh, Target Qaddafi, N.Y. TIMES MAGAZINES, Feb. 22, 1987, at
17-19.
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to Tripoli on April 14, 1986, had a specific mission to target Qaddafi
and his family.' 3 One well-informed Air Force intelligence officer as
stated that "There's no question they were looking for Qaddafi. It was
briefed that way. They were going to kill him."' " The Reagan admini-
stration characterized the attack as a legitimate self-defense operation
under Article 51 in light of evidence that Libya was planning future ter-
rorist attacks against the United States,' 5 an assertion that was rejected
by an overwhelming majority of the members of the United Nations.'
0 6
Shortly thereafter, Senior Army lawyers made public a memorandum
that concluded that Executive Order 12,333 was not intended to prevent
the United States from acting in self-defense against "legitimate threats
to national security.'0 7
During the Persian Gulf War in 1990, Air Force Chief of Staff Mi-
chael J. Dugan publicly stated that the United States might seek to
"decapitate" Iraqi leadership by targeting Saddam Hussein, his family
and even his mistress.' 8 This statement resulted in a great deal of out-
rage in the United States and abroad, and refocused attention on the
permissibility of assassination as an instrument of U.S. policy.'°9
Yet, in the aftermath of the Persian Gulf conflict, an increasing
number of scholars have suggested that assassination has become a le-
gitimate preemptive strategy in light of the growing destructiveness of
current weapons."10 By analogy with the domestic criminal law concept
103. Id.
104. Id. at 20.
105. President's Address to the Nation, DEP'T ST. BULL., June 1986, at 1-2 (Apr. 14,
1986).
106. Of America's traditional allies, only Britain, Israel, and South Africa supported
the raid. Almost every other State, including many of the United States' allies, resoundingly
rejected the legitimacy of the United States' reliance on Article 51 as legal authority for the
Libya raid. The United Nations General Assembly adopted a resolution condemning "the
armed attack by the United States of America in violation of the Charter of the United Na-
tions and the norms of international law," and the United States had to exercise its veto to
prevent a similar resolution from being adopted by the Security Council. Baker, supra note
70, at 101, 103-04, 105-06.
107. Parks, supra note 95, at 8. The Clinton Administration has recently reconfirmed
this position. Deadly Force Against Terrorists is Legal, White House Officials Assert, THE
BOSTON GLOBE, October 29, 1998, at A29.
108. Robert F. Turner, Killing Saddam: Would it be a Crime?, THE WASHINGTON POST,
October 7, 1990, at D1.
109. When Secretary of Defense Richard Cheney learned of Dugan's remarks, he im-
mediately fired him, explaining to reporters that Dugan's comments constituted a potential
violation of the U.S. ban on assassination. Johnson, supra note 100, at 403.
110. See Louis R. Beres, The Permissibility of State-Sponsored Assassination During
Peace and War, 5 TEMPLE INT'L & COMP. L. J. 231, 240 (1992); Michael N. Schmitt, State-
Sponsored Assassination in International and Domestic Law, 17 YALE J. INT'L L. 609, 646
(1992); Turner, supra note 108, at D1.
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of "necessity,""' these commentators argue that assassination can be
justified under a balance of harms analysis, provided that the following
conditions are satisfied.
First, a state must make a good faith effort to circumscribe po-
tential targets to include only those authoritative persons in the
prospective attacking, state. Second, the assassination must
comply with the settled rules of warfare as they concern dis-
crimination, proportionality, and military necessity. Third, state-
gathered intelligence must evidence, beyond a reasonable doubt,
preparations for unconventional or other forms of highly de-
structive warfare projected against the acting state. Finally, the
state must have decided after careful deliberation that an assas-
sination would in fact prevent the intended aggression, and that
it would cause substantially less harm to civilian populations
than alternative forms of self-help. 
2
While anticipatory self-defense can be subject to abuse, the risk of
unleashing the assassination genie from the bottle is even greater. The
prohibition on assassination provides protection to the country's own
leaders who would otherwise be vulnerable to assassination plots by
other states. A reversal of this customary restraint "could unleash a
chain reaction of transnational assassinations and a substantial break-
down of diplomatic relations.""..3 In addition to the risk of retaliation,
targeting specific individuals may unintentionally strengthen enemy
morale and resolve. Finally, the targeted individuals are likely to be re-
placed by others who will continue their threatening policies or by even
less acceptable alternatives. According to Professor Michael Reisman of
Yale Law School, "while tyranicide might present a compelling justifi-
cation for assassination, assassination in any form presents a cascading
threat to world order.""4 For this reason, large numbers of other States
are likely to oppose the use of assassination as a means of enforcing
international law, even if it can be legally justified as a legitimate act of
self-defense.
It is noteworthy, however, that there was almost no international
opposition to the August 20, 1998, U.S. cruise missile attack against
111. See Model Penal Code, Section 3.02 (1985) (providing that conduct believed nec-
essary to avoid some harm is justifiable if "the harm or evil sought to be avoided by such
conduct is greater than that sought to be prevented by the law defining the offense
charged."); Arnolds & Garland, The Defense of Necessity in Criminal Law: The Right to
Choose the Lesser Evil, 65 J. CRIM. L. & C. 289 (1974).
112. Beres, supra note 110, at 240.
113. Id., at 231,241.
114. W.M. Reisman, Covert Action, 20 YALE J. INT'L L. 419,424 (1995).
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terrorist bases in Khost, Afghanistan in an attempt to eliminate Osama
bin Laden and his lieutenants."' International outrage has focussed en-
tirely on the attack on the Al-Shifa plant in Sudan, which was launched
on the same day.
C. Criminalization
The prohibitions embodied in the 1908 Hague Convention, the 1925
Geneva Protocol, the Biological Weapons Convention, and the Chemi-
cal Weapons Convention are directed to the actions of states, not
individuals. Although the Biological and Chemical Weapons Conven-
tions contain provisions obliging each State party to prohibit persons
under their jurisdiction from undertaking activities that are forbidden by
the treaties, these provisions fail to deal with the situation in which an
offender is present in a state that has not established or otherwise lacks
jurisdiction to prosecute, or is complicit with the offender."16 An ap-
proach with great potential, but which has not yet been pursued is to
apply international criminal law to prosecute and punish offending lead-
ers before an international tribunal or domestic courts.
1. Prosecution Before International Criminal Tribunals
On May 25, 1993, the U.N. Security Council, acting under Chapter
VII of the United Nations Charter, established the International Crimi-
nal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (the Tribunal) to prosecute
persons responsible for war crimes, genocide, and crimes against hu-
manity during the Balkan conflict."7 This was the first international war
115. See CNN Interactive, U.S. Missiles Pound Targets in Afghanistan, Sudan, Aug. 21,
1998, (visited Sept. 16, 1998) <http://www.cnn.comUS/9808/20/us.strikes.O2/index.html>.
116. Unlike the Grave Breaches provision of the Geneva Convention, there is no uni-
versal jurisdiction or a duty to prosecute persons who violate the 1908 Hague Convention,
the 1925 Geneva Protocol, the 1972 Biological Weapons Convention, or the 1992 Chemical
Weapons Convention. See Michael Scharf, The Letter of the Law: The Scope of the Interna-
tional Legal Obligation to Prosecute Human Rights Crimes, 59 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBs. 41
(1996).
117. S.C. Res. 827, U.N. SCOR, 48th Sess., at 29, U.N. Doc. S/INF/49 (1994), re-
printed in 2 VIRGINIA MORRIS & MICHAEL P. SCHARF, AN INSIDER'S GUIDE TO THE
INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL TRIBUNAL FOR THE FORMER YUGOSLAVIA 177 (1995) [hereinafter
MORRIS & SCHARF, INSIDER'S GUIDE]. See also the record of the debate leading to the adop-
tion of Resolution 827, U.N. SCOR, 48th Sess., 3217th mtg. at 16, U.N. Doc. S/PV.3217
(1993), reprinted in MORRIS & SCHARF, INSIDER'S GUIDE, supra at 179, 188. Statute of the
International Tribunal for the Prosecution of Persons Responsible for Serious Violations of
International Humanitarian Law Committed in the Territory of the Former Yugoslavia since
1991, annexed to UNITED NATIONS, REPORT OF THE SECRETARY-GENERAL PURSUANT TO
PARAGRAPH 2 OF SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTION 808 (1993), U.N. Doc. S/25704 (1993),
reprinted in MORRIS & SCHARF, INSIDER'S GUIDE, supra at 1.
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crimes tribunal established since the Nuremberg and Tokyo Tribunals
following World War II.
During the next two years, the judges for the Tribunal were elected,
Rules of Procedure and Evidence were promulgated, a Headquarters
Agreement was entered into, the Tribunal's Prosecutor and Registrar
were appointed, courtrooms, offices, and a jail were constructed at The
Hague, a staff of over 500 persons was hired, seventy persons were in-
dicted, and trials were commenced."' The expenses of the Yugoslavia
Tribunal ($60 million in 1998) are covered by a combination of the as-
sessed contributions of the Member States of the United Nations and the
voluntary contributions of States, international organizations, and pri-
vate entities." 9
Ayear after the Security Council decided to establish an ad hoc tri-
bunal for the former Yugoslavia, it created a second ad hoc tribunal to
prosecute those responsible for the genocidal murder of 800,000 mem-
bers of the Tutsi Tribe in the small central African country of Rwanda.'
The creation of the Rwanda Tribunal demonstrated that the international
judicial machinery designed for the Yugoslavia Tribunal could be em-
ployed for other specific circumstances and offenses, thereby avoiding
the need to reinvent the wheel in response to each humanitarian crisis of
similar magnitude.
The two ad hoc Tribunals have jurisdiction over inter alia violations
of the 1908 Hague Convention, which as stated above, prohibits the use
of poisonous weapons, as well as the deployment of weapons
"calculated to cause unnecessary suffering." In addition to the use of
biological and chemical weapons, the Tribunals' jurisdiction also covers
planning and preparation which includes production and stockpiling.'2 '
The Security Council could go even further and expressly endow a new
ad hoc tribunal with subject matter jurisdiction over breaches of the
Biological Weapons Convention and the Chemical Weapons Conven-
tion, in addition to the 1908 Hague Convention.'22
118. See generally MORRIS & SCHARF, INSIDER'S GUIDE, supra note 117.
119. Third Annual Report of the International Tribunal for the Prosecution of Persons
Responsible for Serious Violations of International Humanitarian Law Committed in the
Territory of the Former Yugoslavia since 1991, at 43-44, U.N. Doc. A/51/292-S/1996/665
(1996).
120. Statute of the International Tribunal for Rwanda, annexed to S.C. Res. 955, U.N.
SCOR, 3453 d mtg. at 20, U.N. Doc. S/RES/955 (1994), reprinted in 2 VIRGINIA MORRIS AND
MICHAEL P. SCHARF, THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL TRIBUNAL FOR RWANDA 3 (1998)
[hereinafter MORRIS & SCHARF, TRIBUNAL FOR RWANDA].
121. Yugoslavia Tribunal Statute, art. 7(1), U.N. Doc. S/25704 (1993); Rwanda Tribu-
nal Statute, art. 6(1), U.N. Doc. S/RES/955 (1994).
122. Given the large number of parties, these conventions could be said to reflect cus-
tomary international law. But even if they do not, it is perfectly fair to use them as the basis
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On March 13, 1998, the U.S. Senate passed Concurrent Resolution
78 by a vote of 93 to 0, "call[ing] for the United Nations to form an in-
ternational criminal tribunal for the purpose of indicting, prosecuting,
and imprisoning Saddam Hussein and any other Iraqi officials who may
be found responsible for ... violations of international humanitarian
law."'23 Iraq, which has produced, stockpiled, and used biological and
chemical weapons, would seem to be an ideal candidate for a third Se-
curity Council created Tribunal. After all, the Security Council has
repeatedly condemned Iraq's violations of international humanitarian
law generally and violations of the conventions prohibiting biological
and chemical weapons in particular. It has warned Iraq that individuals,
as well as the Government of Iraq, would be held liable for such viola-
tions. It has called on Member States to submit information about Iraqi
violations of international humanitarian law committed during the Gulf
War, 24 and it has established a Commission to document subsequent
Iraqi violations of the biological and chemical weapons conventions.
2 5
It is important to bear in mind that the effectiveness of such a tribu-
nal does not require that the violating State be vanquished and that the
victor State(s) have custody of those accused of violating the biological
and chemical weapons conventions. There would be utility in obtaining
an international indictment of Saddam Hussein, even if, as would un-
doubtedly be the case, Iraq refused to surrender him to an international
tribunal for trial. The indictment would render Hussein a virtual pris-
oner in his own country, subject to arrest if he ever steps outside its
borders. 6
The procedures for indictment and the issuance of arrest warrants
set forth in the Statute and Rules of the ad hoc International Criminal
Tribunals may be used to stigmatize and constrain accused persons,
even if the accused cannot be arrested and tried immediately. Moreover,
the tribunal's process for confirmation of indictments, which has been
of an international court's subject matter jurisdiction if the country where the acts were
committed is a party to them.
123. See 144 CONG. REC. S1907-105.
124. U.N. Security Council Resolution 674 (1990) 29 October 1990.
125. See supra note 45, at para. 8.
126. Michael Scharf and Valerie Epps, The International Trial of the Century? A
"Cross Fire" Exchange on the First Case Before the Yugoslavia War Crimes Tribunal, 29
CORNELL INT'L L. J. 635, 661 (1996); Remarks of Dr. Roy S. Lee, Principal Legal Officer at
the United Nations, Office of the Legal Counsel, Symposium on War Crimes Tribunal, 6
PACE INT'L L. Rev. 93, 101 (1994).
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described as akin to a "televised grand jury proceeding,"'27 would go a
long way in documenting the international violations.
Yet, the other members of the Security Council have resisted U.S.
proposals for the establishment of additional hoc tribunals. There are
several reasons why the Security Council has been unwilling or unable
to continue with the ad hoc approach to international criminal justice
that was employed for Yugoslavia and Rwanda. The first reason, which
is sometimes referred to as "tribunal fatigue," is that the process of
reaching a consensus on a tribunal's statute, electing judges, selecting a
prosecutor, and appropriating funds has turned out to be extremely time-
consuming and politically exhausting for the members of the Security
Council."8 One Permanent Member of the Security Council, China, has
openly expressed concern about using the Yugoslavia Tribunal as a
precedent for the creation of other ad hoc criminal tribunals."9 Second,
the creation of ad hoc tribunals by the Security Council is viewed as
inherently unfair by many countries, because the Permanent Members
of the Security Council can veto any substantive action by the Security
Council and thereby shield themselves and their allies from the juris-
diction of such tribunals, notwithstanding any atrocities that might be
committed within their borders. The final reason for the reluctance to
create additional ad hoc tribunals is economic. The expense of estab-
lishing ad hoc tribunals is seen as too much for an organization whose
budget is already stretched thin.
With the overwhelming approval of the Rome Statute for a Perma-
nent International Criminal Court in July 1998,30 it is unlikely that the
members of the Security Council would be willing to support the estab-
lishment of an ad hoc tribunal covering violations of the biological and
chemical weapons regimes. Instead, they would insist that such persons
be prosecuted before the new Permanent International Criminal Court.
However, with U.S. opposition to the Permanent International Criminal
127. MICHAEL P. SCHARF, BALKAN JUSTICE: THE STORY BEHIND THE FIRST INTERNA-
TIONAL WAR CRIMES TRIAL SINCE NUREMBERG 151 (1997) [hereinafter SCHARF, BALKAN
JUSTICE].
128. See MORRIS & SCHARF, INSIDER'S GUIDE, supra note 117, at 33-34 (explaining
compromises necessary to gain support for the statute), 144-145 (describing difficulties in
electing judges), 161-163 (discussing controversy in appointing the prosecutor).
129. Id. at 344 n.901, quoting statement of Mr. Li Zhaoxing of China at the time of
voting on Security Council Resolution 827 (1993), which established the Yugoslavia Tribu-
nal. U.N. Doc. S/PV.3217, 25 May 1993, at 33-34. China later abstained on Security
Council Resolution 955 (1994), which established the Rwanda Tribunal.
130. Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.183/9, 17
July 1998. The Statute was approved by a vote of 120 to 7, with 20 abstentions. Of the Per-
manent Members of the Security Council, the United States and China voted against; France,-
Russia, and the United Kingdom voted in favor.
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Court,' the fate of the new tribunal remains in doubt. At a minimum, it
will be several years, perhaps as long as a decade, before the Statute for
a Permanent International Criminal Court receives the 60 ratifications
required for it to enter into force. Even when the Permanent Court is
established, its jurisdiction over use of biological and chemical weapons
will be largely restricted to cases of an international armed conflict.'
Further, the jurisdiction of the Permanent Court would not apply to the
production, transfer, or stockpiling of such weapons, unless they were
ultimately used in combat."'
2. Domestic Assertion of Universal Jurisdiction
In the absence of a new ad hoc tribunal or a permanent international
criminal court, individual states can accomplish many of the same goals
through the exercise of extraterritorial criminal jurisdiction over persons
who violate the biological and chemical weapons conventions. The
United States recently enacted legislation which takes a step in this di-
rection. 34 Title 18, Section 2332a of the United States Code provides
131. Michael P. Scharf, Results of the Rome Conference for an International Criminal
Court, ASIL INSIGHT, August 1998; Prepared Statement of Professor Michael P. Scharf
Before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, FEDERAL NEWS SERVICE, July 23, 1998;
Thomas W. Lippman, America Avoids the Stand: Why the U.S. Objects to A World Criminal
Court, WASHINGTON POST, July 26, 1998, at C1.
132. The Permanent International Criminal Court would have jurisdiction over "serious
violations of the laws and customs applicable in international armed conflict" including:
(xvii) Employing poison or poisoned weapons;
(xviii) Employing asphyxiating, poisonous or other gases, and all analogous liquids,
materials or devices;
(xx) Employing weapons, projectiles and material and methods of warfare which are
of a nature to cause superfluous injury or unnecessary suffering or which are inherently
indiscriminate in violation of the international law of armed conflict, provided that such
weapons, projectiles and material and methods of warfare are subject of a comprehensive
prohibition..."
Supra note 130, at art. 8(2)(b) (xvii), (xviii), and (xx). In the case of an internal armed
conflict, the Court has jurisdiction over, inter alia, persons responsible for "intentionally
directing attacks against the civilian population as such or against individual civilians not
taking direct part in hostilities." Id., at art. 8(2)(e)(i).
133. Id, art. 25.
134. The provisions creating U.S. jurisdiction over biological and chemical weapons
attacks against U.S. nationals were part of a package of anti-terrorism provisions enacted in
the aftermath of the bombing of a federal building on April 19, 1995 in Oklahoma City. See
Roberta Smith, America Tries to Come to Terms With Terrorism: The United States Anti-
Terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 v. British Anti-Terrorism Law and Inter-
national Response, 5 CARDOZO J. INT'L & COMP. L. 249, 260-262 (1997); Thomas C.
Martin, Note, The Comprehensive Terrorism Prevention Act of 1995, 20 SETON HALL LEGIS.
J. 201, 205-06 (1995). There is scant legislative history for the provisions on biological and
chemical weapons, which at the time were not viewed as among the more important aspects
of the legislation. See H.R. CONF. REP. No. 104-518, at 119-27 (1996), reprinted in 1996
U.S.C.C.A.N. 924, 952-60.
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that any person who, "without lawful authority," person uses or threat-
ens, attempts, or conspires to use a weapon of mass destruction,
including any biological agent, toxin, or vector, against a national of the
United States shall be punished, whether such national is within the
United States or not.'35 Section 2332c of that Title similarly punishes
any person who, "without lawful authority," uses, or attempts or con-
spires to use a chemical weapon against a national of the United States
while such national is outside or within the United States. 136 These
criminal provisions are based on the "passive personality" theory of ju-
risdiction, which provides jurisdiction to the United States based on the
nationality of the victim. 137
There are several potential defenses to criminal proceedings under
18 U.S.C. Sections 2332a and 2332c for a person such as Saddam
Hussein. First, the law does not cover production or stockpiling; it cov-
ers only the use of biological or chemical weapons, and then only when
such use is against a U.S. citizen.' 38 On the other hand, production and
stockpiling could be deemed overt acts which are part of a conspiracy to
use such weapons, which is covered. Second, as leader of Iraq,
Hussein's decision to order the production, stockpiling, or use of bio-
logical or chemical weapons would be within the scope of his
Presidential authority, thereby falling outside the statute's prohibition.
However, since such acts are in violation of international law, a court
might conclude that "lawful authority" is absent. Finally, Saddam
Hussein could rely on Head of State immunity to quash an indictment
brought under this statute while he continues to serve as President of
Iraq.13 However, recent cases involving Ferdinand Marcos of the Phil-
ippines, Manuel Noriega of Panama, and Radovan Karadzic of Bosnia 4°
135. 18 U.S.C. § 2332(a) (1997).
136. 18 U.S.C. § 2332(c) (1997).
137. See generally Geoffrey R. Watson, The Passive Personality Principle, 28 TEX.
INT'L L.J. 1 (1993).
138. This in part explains why Osama bin Laden has been indicted for his role in the
Kenya and Tanzania embassy bombings, but not for producing chemical weapons at the Al
Shifa plant. See Colum Lynch, US Indicts Bin Laden in Killings, THE BOSTON GLOBE, No-
vember 5, 1998, at A9.
139. See generally Shobha Varughese George, Head-of-State Immunity in the United
States Courts: Still Confused After All These Years, 64 FORDHAM L. REV. 1051 (1995).
140. See In re Doe, 860 F.2d 40, 45 (2d Cir. 1988)("[T]here is respectable authority for
denying head-of-state immunity to a former head-of-state for private or criminal acts in vio-
lation of American law."); U.S. v. Noriega, 746 F. Supp. 1506, 1519 n. I1 (S.D. Fla. 1990)
("[Tihere is ample doubt whether head of state immunity extends to private or criminal acts
in violation of U.S. law."); Cf Doe v. Karadzic, 866 F. Supp. 734 (S.D.N.Y. 1994) ("[W]e
doubt that the acts of even a state official, taken in violation of a nation's fundamental law
and wholly unratified by that nation's government, could properly be characterized as an act
of state."). But see Lafontant v. Aristide, 844 F. Supp. 128, 138 (E.D.N.Y. 1994) (rejecting
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suggest that U.S. courts might find the doctrine inapplicable in a crimi-
nal case involving flagrant violations of international and U.S. law.14'
The Harvard Sussex Program on Chemical and Biological Warfare
Armament and Arms Limitation has proposed a "Convention on the
Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Developing, Producing, Ac-
quiring, Stockpiling, Retaining, Transferring or Using Biological or
Chemical Weapons" (hereinafter Harvard Draft Convention).1 42 The
Harvard Draft Convention, which is appended at the end of this article,
is modeled upon the several anti-terrorism conventions which provide
for universal jurisdiction and require States to either prosecute or extra-
dite (aut dedere autjudicare) offenders found within their territory.
43
The Harvard Draft Convention avoids the deficiencies inherent in
the current U.S. legislation in three ways. First, the Harvard Draft Con-
vention is based on "universal jurisdiction," which provides State
Parties jurisdiction over individual offenders present in their territory
irrespective of any nexus to the offense. Like pirates, those who violate
the international prohibitions related to chemical and biological weap-
ons would thereby become hostis humani generis "an enemy of all
humankind." Any State party in which such persons are found would
have a duty "without exception whatsoever" to either prosecute or ex-
tradite the alleged offender to another State or international tribunal for
prosecution. Second, the Harvard Draft Convention explicitly covers the
the dicta of In re Doe and finding that such a "theory for circumventing head-of-state immu-
nity is unacceptable.").
141. Head-of-state immunity is based on the doctrine of comity. Thus, U.S. courts tra-
ditionally defer to the State Department's view as to whether head-of-state immunity should
apply in a particular case. See George, supra note 139, at 1061, 1067. In contrast to a civil
suit brought by a private party, in a criminal matter brought by the United States a court
should assume, even without specific State Department guidance, that the U.S. Government
has weighed the foreign policy implications and determined that head-of-state immunity
would be inappropriate under the circumstances.
142. Draft Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Developing,
Producing, Acquiring, Stockpiling, Retaining, Transferring or Using Biological or Chemical
Weapons, drafted Aug. 15, 1998 (on file with the author).
143. See Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts Against the Safety of Mari-
time Navigation (1988), 27 I.L.M. 672; Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel,
Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment (1984), 23 I.L.M. 1027, 24 I.L.M. 535;
Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material (1980), 18 I.L.M. 1422, T.I.A.S.
11080; International Convention Against the Taking of Hostages, Dec. 4, 1979, 18 I.L.M.
1456, T.I.A.S. 11080; Convention on the Prevention of Crimes Against Internationally Pro-
tected Persons, Including Diplomatic Agents, Dec. 14, 1973, 8532 T.I.A.S. 1975, 1035
U.N.T.S. 167; Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts Against the Safety of Civil
Aviation, Sept. 23, 1971, 25 U.S.T. 564, 7570 T.I.A.S. 590; Convention for the Suppression
of Unlawful Seizure of Aircraft, Dec. 16, 1970, 22 U.S.T. 1641, T.I.A.S. 7192, 860 U.N.T.S.
105. The latest anti-terrorism convention with the prosecute or extradite formula is the Inter-
national Convention for the Suppression of Terrorist Bombings, which was opened for
signature in January, 1998. A/RES/52/164.
[Vol. 20:477
Spring 1999] International Ban on Biological & Chemical Weapons 507
development, production, stockpiling, and transfer, as well as actual use,
of biological or chemical weapons. Third, it expressly provides that
Head of State or diplomatic immunity is inapplicable to these crimes, 1
4
and denies the defense of superior orders.
4
1
While it would certainly help close the gap between the interna-
tional law prohibiting chemical and biological weapons and the
enforcement of that law, the Harvard Draft Convention should not be
viewed as a panacea. In light of past politically-motivated, false accusa-
tions of violations of the chemical and biological weapons
conventions, 46 proceedings before domestic courts exercising universal
jurisdiction may not possess the same credibility or carry with them the
same international reprobation as proceedings before a neutral interna-
tional tribunal would. A second weakness inherent in a regime requiring
144. Other international conventions which exempt offenders from claiming diplomatic
or head-of-state immunity include: Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the
Crime of Genocide, Dec. 9. 1948, art. 4, 78 U.N.T.S. 277 (1951) ("Persons committing
genocide or any of the other acts enumerated ... shall be punished, whether they are consti-
tutionally responsible rulers, public officials or private individuals."); and International
Convention on the Suppression and Punishment of the International Crime of Apartheid
(1973), 28 U.N. GAOR, Supp. No. 30, U.N. Doc. A/9030 ("International criminal responsi-
bility shall apply, irrespective of the motive involved, to individuals, members of
organizations and institutions and representatives of the State"). The Statutes Of the Interna-
tional Criminal Tribunals for the former Yugoslavia and Rwanda similarly provide, "[Tihe
official position of any accused person, whether as head of State or Government or as a re-
sponsible Government official, shall not relieve such person of criminal responsibility nor
mitigate punishment." Statute of the International Tribunal for the Prosecution of Persons
Responsible for Serious Violations of International Humanitarian Law Committed in the
Territory of the Former Yugoslavia since 1991, art. 7(2), annexed to UNITED NATIONS, Re-
port of the Secretary-General Pursuant to Paragraph 2 of Security Council Resolution 808
(1993), U.N. Doc. S/25704 (1993), reprinted in MORRIS & SCHARF, INSIDER'S GUIDE, supra
note 117; Statute of the International Tribunal for Rwanda, art. 6(2), annexed to S.C. Res.
955, U.N. SCOR, 3453 mtg. At 6, U.N. Doc. S/RES/955 (1994), reprinted in MORRIS &
SCHARF, TRIBUNAL FOR RWANDA, supra note 120.
145. The illegitimacy of the defense of superior orders for international crimes was
recognized in the Charter of the Nuremberg Tribunal and has been reaffirmed in the Statutes
of the International Criminal Tribunals for the Former Yugoslavia and Rwanda. See MORRIS
& SCHARF, TRIBUNAL FOR RWANDA, supra note 120, at 262-68. Current U.S. law, in con-
trast, recognizes the defense of superior orders unless the order was manifestly illegal, that is
"a man of ordinary sense and understanding" would know the order was illegal. See United
States v. Calley, No. 26875, 1973 WL 14894 (C.M.A. Dec. 21, 1973); see also JORDAN
PAUST ET AL., INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW: CASES AND MATERIALS 1373-76 (1996).
146. For years, the United States government maintained that it had evidence of Soviet
responsibility for the use of biological weapons known as "yellow rain" in Indochina from
1982 to 1986. See Zilinskas, supra note 25, at 984, 986. While many commentators continue
to cite the yellow rain episode as a breach of the biological weapons convention, there is
reason to believe that the story was fabricated by the United States as part of its cold-war
disinformation campaign and as a way to justify further U.S. biowar research and handsome
congressional appropriations. Julian Robinson, Jeanne Guillemin & Matthew Meselson,
Yellow Rain in Southeast Asia: The Story Collapses, in PREVENTING A BIOLOGICAL ARMS
RACE, Ch. 10 (Susan Wright ed. 1990).
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domestic prosecutions concerns protection of sensitive intelligence
sources and methods. It is one thing to share satellite surveillance pho-
tos, telephone intercepts and information gathered by undercover
operatives with other governments in a closed session of the Security
Council, which may be necessary to justify use of force or imposition of
sanctions; it is quite another to have to divulge such information in open
court as would be required in a criminal prosecution.' 47 Finally, interna-
tional adoption of the Harvard Draft Convention would have a
significant deterrent effect, but it could no more guarantee an end to all
chemical and biological weapons use than the Genocide Convention
8
has prevented outbreaks of genocide in the years since its adoption in
1948.'9
CONCLUSION
So far there have been three main stages in the evolution of interna-
tional law governing chemical and biological weapons. First, an
international treaty regime prohibiting these weapons was established, a
prohibition that is now recognized as customary international law. Sec-
ond, this treaty regime was expanded and fortified by filling in existing
gaps. Third, a verification regime was created, which enabled the inter-
national community to detect and publicize non-compliance. To retain
vitality, the prohibition on chemical and biological weapons requires
that there be an expectation of consequences to its violation. The next
stage in the evolution will focus on strengthening the means of en-
forcement.
The traditional means of enforcement relies on the United Nations
Security Council, which may impose a range of sanctions, including the
use of force, to enforce the international prohibition on chemical and
biological weapons. However, the Security Council's robust response to
Iraq's possession of biological and chemical weapons in the aftermath
of its invasion of Kuwait has been the exception. More often, the Secu-
rity Council has been paralyzed by the threat or use of the veto by the
147. This prospect may deter governments from making extradition requests or indict-
ing persons for violations of the chemical and biological weapons conventions.
148. Supra note 144.
149. The existence of the widely ratified Genocide Convention, with its similar univer-
sal jurisdiction regime and extradite or prosecute requirement, did not prevent the
extermination of 750,000 Ugandans (1971-1987), the annihilation of 2 million Cambodians
(1975-1979), the massacre of 200,000 East Timorans (1971-1987), the gassing of 100,000
Kurds in Iraq (1987-1988), the slaughter of 250,000 Muslims in Bosnia (1992-1995), or the
mass murder of 800,000 Tutsis in Rwanda (1994). See SCHARF, BALKAN JUSTICE, supra note
127, at xiii-xiv.
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permanent members, and has taken no action in response to repeated
violations of the chemical and biological weapons conventions.
In light of the Security Council's repeated failure to take effective
action to eliminate the threat posed by a State's possession of chemical
or biological weapons, States may increasingly be tempted to act unilat-
erally, following the example of the American attack on the Sudanese
chemical weapons plant in August 1998. However weak the evidence
concerning the Al-Shifa plant turns out to be, the attack sets an impor-
tant precedent on which States may choose to rely in dealing with
terrorist or state-sponsored biological and chemical weapons threats.
The danger of abuse created by an expansive interpretation of Article 51
to permit assassination is even greater than it is where it is interpreted to
permit attacks on suspected chemical and biological weapons. But at
some point, the danger to international stability created by permitting
radical leaders such as Saddam Hussein to use biological and chemical
weapons with impunity exceeds the danger posed by the potential for
nations to abuse an expanded interpretation of Article 51 for their own
illegitimate ends. 50
Deterrence and enforcement of the chemical and biological weapons
conventions presently relies on the threat or imposition of sanctions or
military force, both of which are blunt instruments which tend to harm
the innocent population and infrequently succeed in altering the policies
of the responsible rulers. A third means of enforcement, which would
supplement rather than replace the traditional approaches, is to apply
international criminal law to prosecute and punish offending leaders in
domestic courts or international tribunals.
The international criminalization of chemical and biological weap-
ons violations through the establishment of ad hoc international
tribunals and/or a regime of universal jurisdiction, using the Harvard
Draft Convention as a model, would have many benefits. First, it could
potentially strengthen the norm against chemical and biological weap-
ons, enhance deterrence of potential offenders, and facilitate
international cooperation in suppressing the prohibited activities. Unlike
sanctions and the use of force, criminalization avoids collective pun-
ishment by directly targeting those responsible for the international
violations. In addition, criminalization can strengthen international po-
litical will to maintain sanctions and take more aggressive actions if
necessary. A criminal indictment can also serve to isolate offending
leaders diplomatically and strengthen the hand of domestic political
150. Baker, supra note 70, at 116.
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rivals. 5 ' Just imagine if every time Saddam Hussein's name appeared in
the international press, it was followed by the moniker "indicted inter-
national criminal."
Ultimately, the success of the anti-chemical and biological weapons
regimes requires the reestablishment of what author Richard Price calls
the "chemical and biological weapons taboo.' ' 2 The addition of crimi-
nalization to the existing means of enforcement will go a long way
toward that end.
151. This has proven effective with respect to Radovan Karadzic, the once powerful
leader of the Bosnian Serbs who has been forced into hiding and politically marginalized by
the international indictment and warrant for his arrest. See Interview with General William
Nash, former Commander of the U.S. forces in Bosnia (Sept. 29, 1998) (transcript on file
with the author).
152. PRICE, supra note 17.
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APPENDIX
[Harvard-Sussex Draft, 15 August 1998]
DRAFT CONVENTION ON THE PREVENTION AND
PUNISHMENT OF THE CRIME OF DEVELOPING,
PRODUCING, ACQUIRING, STOCKPILING, RETAINING,
TRANSFERRING OR USING BIOLOGICAL
OR CHEMICAL WEAPONS
PREAMBLE
The States Parties to this Convention,
Recalling that States are prohibited by the Geneva Protocol of 1925,
the Biological Weapons Convention of 1972 and the Chemical Weapons
Convention of 1993, and other international agreements, from develop-
ing, producing, stockpiling, acquiring, retaining, transferring or using
biological and chemical weapons, and that these prohibitions reflect a
worldwide norm against these weapons;
Recognizing that any development, production and use of biological
and chemical weapons is the result of the decisions and actions of indi-
vidual persons, including government officials, and that these activities
are now within the capability not only of States but also of other entities
and of individuals;
Affirming that all persons and entities should be prohibited from en-
gaging in these activities, and should be subject to effective penal
sanctions, thereby ensuring and enhancing the effectiveness of the Ge-
neva Protocol, the Biological Weapons Convention and the Chemical
Weapons Convention;
Reaffirming that any use of disease or poison for hostile purposes is
repugnant to the conscience of humankind;
Consider that biological and chemical weapons pose a threat to the
well-being of all humanity and to future generations;
Resolving that knowledge and achievements in biology, chemistry
and medicine should be used exclusively for the health and well-being
of humanity;
Desiring. to encourage the peaceful and beneficial advance and ap-
plication of these sciences by protecting them from adverse
consequences that would result from their hostile exploitation;
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Determined, for the sake of human beings everywhere and of future
generations, to eliminate the threat of biological and chemical weapons;
Have agreed as follows:
ARTICLE I
I Any person commits an offence who knowingly:
(a) develops, produces, otherwise acquires, stockpiles or
retains any biological or chemical weapon, or transfers, di-
rectly or indirectly, to anyone, any biological or chemical
weapon;
(b) uses any biological or chemical weapon;
(c) engages in preparations to use any biological or
chemical weapon;
(d) assists, encourages or induces, in any way , anyone to
engage in any of the above activities;
(e) orders or directs anyone to engage in any of the above
activities;
(f) attempts to commit any of the above offenses.
ARTICLE II
1. Nothing in this Convention shall be construed as prohibiting
activities that are not prohibited under:
(a) the Convention on the Prohibition of the Develop-
ment, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological
(Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on their Destruction,
of 10 April 1972, or
(b) the Convention on the Prohibition of the Develop-
ment, Production, Stockpiling and Use of Chemical
Weapons and on their Destruction, done at Paris on 13
January 1993, or that are directed toward the fulfillment of
a State's obligations under either Convention and are con-
ducted in accordance with its provisions.
2. In a prosecution for an offence set forth in Article 1, it shall
be a defence that the accused person reasonably believed
that the conduct in question was not prohibited under this
Convention.
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3. It is not a defence that a person charged with an offence set
forth in Article I acted in an official capacity, under the or-
ders or instructions of a superior, or otherwise in
accordance with internal law.
ARTICLE III
For the purposes of the present Convention:
1. "BIOLOGICAL WEAPONS" means:
(a) microbial or other biological agents, or toxins what-
ever their origin or method of production, of types and in
quantities that have no justification for prophylactic, pro-
tective or other peaceful purposes;
(b) weapons, equipment or means of delivery designed to
use such agents or toxins for hostile purposes or in armed
conflict.
2. "CHEMICAL WEAPONS" means the following, together or sepa-
rately:
(a) toxic chemicals and their precursors, except where in-
tended for:
(i) industrial, agricultural, research, medical, pharma-
ceutical or other peaceful purposes;
(ii) protective purposes, namely those purposes di-
rectly related to protection against toxic chemicals and to
protection against chemical weapons;
(iii) military purposes not connected with the use of
chemical weapons and not dependent on the use of the toxic
properties of chemicals as a method of warfare;
(iv) law enforcement including domestic riot control
purposes. As long as the types and quantities are consistent
with such purposes.
(b) munitions and devices, specifically designed to cause
death or other harm through the toxic properties of those
toxic chemicals specified in subparagraph (a), which would
be released as a result of the employment of such munitions
and devices;
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(c) any equipment specifically designed for use directly in
connection with the employment of munitions and devices
specified in subparagraph (b).
3. "Toxic CHEMICAL" means any chemical which through its
chemical action on life processes can cause death, tempo-
rary incapacitation or permanent harm to humans or
animals. This includes all such chemicals, regardless of
their origin or of their method of production, and regardless
of whether they are produced in facilities, in munitions or
elsewhere.
4. "PRECURSOR" means any chemical reactant which takes part
at any stage in the production by whatever method of a
toxic chemical. This includes any key component of a bi-
nary or multi component chemical system, that is to say, the
precursor which plays the most important role on deter-
mining the toxic properties of the final product and reacts
rapidly with other chemicals in the binary or multi compo-
nent system.
5. "PERSON" means any natural person or, to the extent con-
sistent with internal law as to criminal responsibility, any
legal entity.
ARTICLE IV
Each State Party shall adopt such measures as may be necessary:
(a) to establish as criminal offenses under its internal law
the offenses set forth in Article 1;
(b) to make those offenses punishable by appropriate pen-
alties which take into account their grave nature.
ARTICLE V
1. Each State Party to this Convention shall take such meas-
ures as may be necessary to establish its jurisdiction over
the offenses set forth in Article I in the following cases:
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(a) when the offence was committed in the territory of
that State or on board a ship or aircraft registered in that
State;
(b) when the alleged offender is a national of that State;
(c) when, if that State considers it appropriate, the alleged
offender is a stateless person whose habitual residence is in
its territory;
(d) when the offence was committed with intent to harm
that State or its nationals or to compel that State to do or ab-
stain from doing any act;
(e) when the offence involved the use of biological or
chemical weapons and victim of the offence was a national
of that State.
2. Each State Party shall likewise take such measures as may
be necessary to establish its jurisdiction over the offenses
set forth in Article I in cases where the alleged offender is
present in its territory and it does not extradite such person
pursuant to Articles VI and VII.
3. This Convention does not exclude any criminal jurisdiction
exercised in accordance with internal law.
4. Jurisdiction with respect to the offenses set forth in Article I
may also be exercised by any international criminal court
that may have jurisdiction in the matter in accordance with
its Statute
ARTICLE VI
1. Upon receiving information that a person who has commit-
ted or who is alleged to have committed an offence as set
forth in article I may be present in its territory, a State Party
shall take such measures as may be necessary under its in-
ternal law to investigate the facts contained in the
information.
2. If it is satisfied that the circumstances so warrant, a State
Party in the territory of which an alleged offender is present
shall take that person into custody or shall take such other
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measures as are necessary to ensure the presence of that
person for the purpose of prosecution or extradition.
3. Any person regarding whom the measures referred to in
paragraph 2 are being taken shall be entitled to:
(a) communicate without delay with the nearest appropri-
ate representative of the State of which that person is a
national or which is otherwise entitled to protect that per-
son's rights or, if that person is a stateless person, the State
in the territory of which that person habitually resides;
(b) be visited by a representative of that State;
(c) be informed of that person's rights under subpara-
graphs (a) and (b).
The rights referred to in paragraph 3 shall be exercised in confor-
mity with the laws and regulations of the State in the territory of which
the offender or alleged offender is present, provided that the said laws
and regulations must enable full effect to be given to the purposes for
which the rights accorded under paragraph 3 are intended.
When a State Party, pursuant to the present article, has taken a per-
son into custody, it shall promptly notify, directly or through the
Secretary-General of the United Nations, the States Parties which have
established jurisdiction in accordance with article V, paragraph 1, and,
if it considers it advisable, any other interested States Parties, of the fact
that person is in custody and of the circumstances which warrant that
person's detention. The State which makes the investigation contem-
plated in paragraph 1 of the present article shall promptly inform those
States Parties of its findings and shall indicate whether it intends to ex-
ercise jurisdiction.
ARTICLE VII
1. The offenses set forth in Article I shall be deemed to be in-
cluded as extraditable offenses in any extradition treaty
existing between States Parties. States Parties undertake to
include those offenses as extraditable offenses in every ex-
tradition treaty subsequently concluded between them.
2. If a State Party which makes extradition conditional on the
existence of a treaty receives a request for extradition from
another State Party with which it has no extradition treaty, it
may, if it decides to extradite, consider this Convention as
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the legal basis for extradition in respect of the offenses set
forth in Article 1. Extradition shall be subject to the other
conditions provided by the law of the requested State.
3. States Parties which do not make extradition conditional on
the existence of a treaty shall recognize the offenses set
forth in Article I as extraditable offenses as between them-
selves subject to the conditions provided by the law of the
requested State.
4. The offenses set forth under Article I shall be treated, for
the purpose of extradition between States Parties, as if they
had been committed not only in the place in which they oc-
curred but also in the territories of the States required to
establish their jurisdiction in accordance with paragraph 1
of Article V.
5. The provisions of all extradition treaties and arrangements
between States Parties with regard to offenses set forth in
Article I shall be deemed to be modified as between State
Parties to the extent that they are incompatible with this
Convention.
ARTICLE VIII
The State Party in the territory of which the alleged offender is
found shall, if it does not extradite such person, be obliged, without ex-
ception whatsoever and whether or not the offence was committed in its
territory, to submit the case without delay to competent authorities for
the purpose of prosecution, through proceedings in accordance with the
laws of that State. Those authorities shall take their decision in the same
manner as in the case of any other offence of a grave nature under the
law of that State.
ARTICLE IX
1. States Parties shall afford one another the greatest measure
of assistance in connection with investigations or criminal
or extradition proceedings brought in respect of the offenses
set forth in Article 1, including assistance in obtaining evi-
dence at their disposal which is necessary for the
proceedings.
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2. States Parties shall carry out their obligations under para-
graph 1 in conformity with any treaties or other
arrangements on mutual legal assistance that may exist be-
tween them. In the absence of such treaties or arrangements,
States Parties shall afford one another assistance in accor-
dance with their internal law.
ARTICLE X
None of the offenses set forth in Article I shall be regarded, for the
purposes of extradition or mutual legal assistance, as a political offence
or as an offence connected with a political offence or as an offence in-
spired by political motives. Accordingly, a request for extradition or for
mutual legal assistance based on such an offence may not be refused on
the sole ground that it concerns a political offence or an offence con-
nected with a political offence or an offence inspired by political
motives.
ARTICLE XI
Nothing in this Convention shall be interpreted as imposing an obli-
gation to extradite or to afford mutual legal assistance, if the requested
State Party has substantial grounds for believing that the request for ex-
tradition for offenses set forth in Article I or for mutual legal assistance
with respect to such offenses has been made for the purpose of prose-
cuting or punishing a person on account of that person's race, religion,
nationality, ethnic origin or political opinion or that compliance with the
request would cause prejudice to that person's position for any of these
reasons.
ARTICLE XII
States Parties shall cooperate in the prevention of the offenses set
forth in Article 1, particularly by:
(a) taking all practicable measures to prevent preparations
in their respective territories for the commission of those of-
fenses within or outside their territories;
(b) exchanging information and coordinating the taking of
administrative and other measures as appropriate to prevent
commission of those offenses.
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ARTICLE XIII
1. Each State Party shall inform the Secretary-General of the
United Nations of the legislative and administrative meas-
ures taken to implement this Convention. In particular, each
State Party shall notify the Secretary-General of the United
Nations of the jurisdiction it has established under its do-
mestic law in accordance with paragraph 3 of Article V.
Should any change take place, the State Party concerned
shall immediately notify the Secretary-General.
2. Each State Party shall, in accordance with its national law,
promptly provide to the Secretary-General of the United
Nations any relevant information in its possession con-
cerning:
(a) the circumstances of any offence over which it has
established its jurisdiction pursuant to paragraph I of Article
V;
(b) the measures taken in relation to the alleged offender,
and, in particular, the results of any extradition proceedings
or other legal proceedings.
3. The State Party where an alleged offender is prosecuted
shall communicate the final outcome of the proceedings to
the Secretary-General of the United Nations, who shall
transmit the information to the other States Parties.
4. Each State Party shall designate a contact point within its
government to which other States Parties may communicate
in matters relevant to this Convention. Each State Party
shall make such designation known to the Secretary-
General..
ARTICLE XIV
Any dispute between States Parties concerning the interpretation or
application of this Convention which is not settled by negotiation shall,
at the request of one of them, be submitted to arbitration. If within six
months from the date of the request for arbitration the parties are unable
to agree on the organization of the arbitration, any one of those parties
may refer the dispute to the International Court of justice.
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ARTICLE XV
I Ten years after the entry into force of this Convention, or
earlier if it is requested by a majority of Parties to the Con-
vention by submitting a proposal to this effect to the
Secretary-General of the United Nations, a Conference of
States Parties shall be held at [Geneva, Switzerland], to re-
view the operation of the Convention with a view to
assuring that the purposes of the preamble and the provi-
sions of the Convention are being realized.
2. At intervals of seven years thereafter, unless otherwise de-
cided upon, further sessions of the Conference may be
convened with the same objective.
ARTICLE XVI
1. This Convention shall be open for signature by all States
from [DATE] until [DATE] at United Nations Headquarters
in New York.
2 This Convention is subject to ratification, acceptance or ap-
proval. The instruments of ratification, acceptance or
approval shall be deposited with the Secretary-General of
the United Nations.
3. This Convention shall be open to accession by any State.
The instruments of accession shall be deposited with the
Secretary-General of the United Nations.
ARTICLE XVII
1. This Convention shall enter into force on the thirtieth day
following the date of the deposit of the [NUMBER] instru-
ment of ratification, acceptance, approval or accession with
the Secretary-General of the United Nations.
2. For each State ratifying, accepting, approving or acceding
to the Convention after the deposit of the [NUMBER] in-
strument of ratification, acceptance, approval or accession,
the Convention shall enter into force on the thirtieth day
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after deposit by such State of its instrument of ratification,
acceptance, approval or accession.
ARTICLE XVIII
The Articles of this Convention shall not be subject to
reservation.
ARTICLE XIX
The original of this Convention, of which the Arabic, Chinese, Eng-
lish, French, Russian and Spanish texts are equally authentic, shall be
deposited with the Secretary-General of the United Nations, who shall
send certified copies thereof to all States.
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, the undersigned, being duly authorized
thereto by their respective Governments, have signed this Convention,
opened for signature at United Nations Headquarters in New York on
[DATE].
